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Abstract
If the number of individuals is odd, Campbell and Kelly (2003) show that major-
ity rule is the only non–dictatorial strategy–proof social choice rule on the domain
of linear orders that admit a Condorcet winner, an alternative that is preferred to
every other by a majority of individuals in pairwise majority voting. This paper
shows that the claim is false when the number of individuals is even, and provides a
characterization of non–dictatorial strategy–proof social choice rules on this domain.
Two examples illustrate the primary reason that the result does not translate to the
even case: when the number of individuals is even, no single individual can change
her reported preference ordering in a manner that changes the Condorcet winner
while remaining within the preference domain. Introducing two new definitions to
account for this partitioning of the preference domain, the chapter concludes with a
counterpart to the characterization of Campbell and Kelly (2003) for the even case.
Adapting the models of Laibson (1994) and O’Donogue and Rabin (2001), a
learning–na¨ıve agent is presented who is endowed with beliefs about the value of
the quasi–hyperbolic discount factor that enters into the utility calculations of her
future–selves. Facing an infinite–horizon decision problem in which the payo↵ to a
particular action varies stochastically, the agent updates her beliefs over time. Con-
iii
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ditions are given under which the behavior of a learning–na¨ıve agent is eventually
indistinguishable from that of a sophisticated agent, contributing to the e↵orts of Ali
(2011) to justify the use of sophistication as a modeling assumption.
Building upon the literature on one–to–one matching pioneered by Gale and Shap-
ley (1962), this paper introduces a social network to the standard marriage model,
embodying informational limitations of the agents. Motivated by the restrictive na-
ture of stability in large markets, two new network–stability concepts are introduced
that reflect informational limitations; in particular, two agents cannot form a blocking
pair if they are not acquainted. Following Roth and Sotomayor (1990), key properties
of the sets of network–stable matchings are derived, and concludes by introducing a
network–formation game whose set of complete–information Nash equilibria corre-
spond to the set of stable matchings.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
On a fundamental level, the study of microeconomic theory can be understood
to be a study in incentives. At their most basic element, economic models illustrate
a decision maker who, faced with a sequence of known or expected payo↵s that are
conditional on an implemented action, must choose from some pre–specified choice
or action set so as to maximize her expected payo↵. In this context, the structure
of the payo↵ implicitly constitute incentives: the nature of the payo↵ scheme and
the di↵erences in expected payo↵s conditional on implementing di↵erent actions or
making di↵erent choices is of sole significance in determining the action that will be
implemented by the agent.
Within this work, incentives will be considered through three distinct filters in
three divergent modeling environments. Although formally residing in di↵erent sub-
fields of microeconomic theory – social choice theory, behavioral economics, and mar-
ket design – the models of the subsequent three chapters share the common dialogue
of incentives.
1
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Focusing first on a model in which incentive questions are relevant at an individual
level within a larger social setting, Chapter 2 characterizes non–dictatorial voting rules
that satisfy the particular incentive compatibility requirement of strategy–proofness:
a voting rule is strategy–proof if it is in the best interest of each individual to vote
truthfully (that is, to reveal her true preferences) regardless of the behavior or pref-
erences of other voters. The study of voting rules is only meaningful within the
context of a larger society, as voting becomes trivial in a society of a single individ-
ual. Nonetheless, the incentive concept is one that focuses on individual behavior by
asking that each agent have the unique dominant strategy of voting truthfully.
Chapter 2 focuses on a particular question in social choice theory, and provides
a counter–point to an existing majority rule characterization result. Given a set of
individuals, N , and a set of feasible alternatives, X, a social choice rule selects a
single alternative from X as a function of individual preferences. May (1952) char-
acterized majority rule as the unique social welfare function satisfying Independence
of Irrelevant Alternatives, Neutrality, Anonymity, and a strong positive responsive-
ness axiom, the last of which Maskin (1995) replaced with the Pareto criterion in
showing that any social welfare function other than majority rule satisfying the four
axioms will fail to be transitive–valued at some preference profile at which majority
rule is transitive–valued. Using a weaker set of axioms, Campbell and Kelly (2000)
established the same result.
Campbell and Kelly (2003) provide a strategy–proofness characterization of ma-
jority rule as the unique non–dictatorial strategy–proof social choice rule when there
is an odd number of individuals with strict preferences in the Condorcet domain, the
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domain of linear preference profiles at which there exists an alternative that is pre-
ferred to every other alternative by some strict majority of individuals. Furthermore,
they show that when there is an even number of individuals, if a social choice rule
is non–dictatorial and cannot be manipulated by individuals or by two–individual
coalitions, then it is majority rule.
In Chapter 2, two examples are given of non–dictatorial strategy–proof social
choice rules on the Condorcet domain with an even number of individuals that are
distinct from majority rule. The construction of these examples relies on a key feature
of the preference domain that is parity–dependent: when there is an even number of
individuals, the Condorcet domain can be partitioned into components such that no
individual can change her reported preference ordering in a manner that moves the
reported preference profile from one partition component to another.
To formalize these structural di↵erences, three lemmas are introduced, which show
respectively the existence of a natural partition of the Condorcet domain, the impli-
cations of this partition for strategy–proofness, and how strategy–proof rules on the
Condorcet domain can be deconstructed into strategy–proof rules on smaller domains
via the partition components. Theorem 2.4.4 employs these lemmas in characterizing
non–dictatorial strategy–proof rules on the Condorcet domain with an even number
of individuals, and Theorem 2.4.11 provides a counterpart to the Campbell and Kelly
(2003) result when n is even.
The Condorcet domain is an admittedly restrictive domain; in particular, it is
worth noting that an individual considering a manipulation is constrained in her ad-
missible reported preferences by the reported preferences of the other individuals.
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Campbell and Kelly (2003) justify consideration of this domain as providing a com-
plement to the Maskin (1995) social welfare function characterization of majority rule.
In the context of Chapter 2, consideration of the Condorcet domain is employed to
illustrate the crucial dependence of the Campbell and Kelly (2003) characterization
of majority rule on the parity of the set of individuals.
The main contribution of this chapter therefore lies in identifying this dependence
and illustrating through Examples 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 that the characterization does not
hold for an even number of individuals. The axiomatic characterization of non–
dictatorial strategy–proof social choice rules on this domain should be viewed as a
supplementary result meant to formalize the crucial role that parity plays in the
characterization result: when the set of individuals is odd, majority rule is uniquely
non–dictatorial and strategy–proof; when the set of individuals is even, there many
rules satisfying these criteria, of which majority rule is one of the less exotic members.
Moving into the area of behavioral economics, Chapter 3 constructs a model in
which internal incentives are of crucial importance. Here, there is no society to
speak of, only an individual agent facing an infinite horizon decision problem while
partially aware of her time–inconsistent preferences. Within this single–agent model,
incentives interplay between the various contemporaneous selves acting in each period;
the agent’s behavior today must be a best response to the anticipated actions of her
future selves, and may in fact have a large influence on their action sets. In an
environment in which the tendency to procrastinate abounds, the classic behavioral
types exhibit very distinct equilibrium behavior: the na¨ıve agent, unaware of the time–
inconsistency of her preferences, postpones indefinitely the completion of a task even
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when delay is costly; the sophisticated agent, fully aware of her time–inconsistency,
completes the task immediately along the equilibrium path.
Chapter 3 introduces a new type of behavioral agent, a learning–na¨ıve agent,
whose observed equilibrium behavior in an infinite–horizon decision problem bridges
the gap between the observed behavior of na¨ıve and sophisticated agents. Behav-
ioral economics has large focused on two main types of agents with time–inconsistent
preferences: naifs and sophisticates. Both types of agents are modeled as a sequence
of autonomous temporal selves indexed by time, with per period utility functions
characterized by a ( ,  ) pair, where   2 (0, 1) represents the agent’s discounting of
all future periods relative to the current period and   2 (0, 1) represents the agent’s
discounting between consecutive periods. Na¨ıve agents are unaware of the dynamic
inconsistency of their preferences, and believe that future–period selves will make util-
ity maximizing decisions that coincide with the decision that the current period self
would make for them; that is, they believe that future–period will behave as if   = 1.
Hence, utility maximizing na¨ıve agents do not choose to employ costly commitment
mechanisms that restrict the behavior of future–period selves. Sophisticated agents,
on the other hand, recognize that their preferences are dynamically inconsistent and
that without the implementation of commitment mechanisms, future–period selves
will make decisions that are suboptimal with regard to their current period utility
function.
In infinite–horizon models of costly procrastination, the standard result is for na¨ıve
agents to procrastinate indefinitely and for sophisticated agents to employ a commit-
ment mechanism in which the task is accomplished in the first period. Della Vigna
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and Malmendier (2006) o↵er data on healthy club memberships that do not appear
to support these results. In particular, note that “low–attendance consumers delay-
ing canceling [their membership]...despite small transaction costs.” That is, agents
for whom the maintenance of a health club membership is costly relative to their
benefits from exercise (i.e., those who do not frequently use the facilities) maintain
their membership for a significant number of periods. However, even these agents
eventually terminate their membership; in their data on monthly membership uses,
over 75% of low–frequency members terminated their membership within twenty–four
periods; for comparison, roughly one third terminated membership within 12 periods,
and over 60% terminated their membership within 18 periods. As Della Vigna and
Malmendier Della Vigna and Malmendier (2006) note, “observed consumer behavior
is di cult to reconcile with standard preferences and beliefs.”
Where Della Vigna and Malmendier (2006) propose a model of overconfidence in
future self–control, Chapter 3 proposes a model of learning in which a learning–na¨ıve
agent slowly moves from na¨ıve–type optimization behavior to sophisticated–type opti-
mization behavior by experiencing stochastic per period shocks to her utility function.
The learning–na¨ıve agent is initially uncertain about the value of   that enters into
the utility functions of her past– and future–period selves, but holds prior beliefs
about the value,  ˆ. By observing the stochastic shocks and action choices of past
selves, the learning–na¨ıve agent is able to update her beliefs about the value of  ˆ, the
quasi–hyperbolic discount factor of her past– and future–period selves. Given su -
ciently many periods and su cient variation in the stochastic shocks, the equilibrium
behavior of the learning–na¨ıve agent eventually converges with that of the sophisti-
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cated agent: when the parameters of the model are such that the sophisticated agent
would employ a commitment mechanism, the learning–na¨ıve agent will eventually do
the same.
Returning to a non–degenerate society of many individuals, Chapter 4 adapts
the standard one–to–one matching literature to an environment in which individual
agents have very limited information about the market in which they interact. In
particular, agents are assumed to only be acquainted with a certain subset of the
population. Here, the equilibrium concept rests on pair–compatible incentives: in the
proposed marriage market with local information, a matching is stable if there exist
no pairs of individuals who are acquainted with one another and who prefer to be
matched to one another than to their partners has prescribed by the matching. Here,
verifying the incentive compatibility of a proposed match requires joint consideration
of two individuals preferences simultaneously.
Chapter 4 presents a model of one–to–one matching in which agents have limited
information about the composition of the matching market. In the standard one–
to–one matching model of Gale and Shapley (1962), agents are implicitly assumed to
have complete knowledge of the identities of the other agents in the market, their own
preferences over these agents, and the preferences of the other agents. In Chapter 4,
the standard one–to–one two–sided matching model is augmented by introducing a
concept of local stability. Notions of distance are encoded in a social network, in
which directly linked agents are viewed as being “close” to one another. This net-
work structure allows for the introduction of two new definitions of stable matchings,
depending on the interpretation of the network. Under the first definition, the net-
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work is seem as limiting the set of potential blocking pairs: only agents who are linked
in the network share enough information about one another’s preferences to block a
potential match. Under the second definition, the network is seen as additionally
imposing direct restrictions on the pairs of agents who can be matched: agents who
are not located su ciently close enough – that is, who are not linked – cannot be
matched to one another at any stable matching.
Following Roth and Sotomayor (1990), the analogous properties of these two sets of
network–stable matchings are derived for comparison to the standard model. Through
the implementation of an augmented Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (Gale and Shap-
ley, 1962), the existence of both types of network–stable matching is shown for generic
marriage networks. Moreover, nesting relations between the two new network–stable
matching sets and the set of stable matchings on the associated marriage network
are derived, and examples are provided to illustrate cases in which nesting does not
generally hold. Finally, the marriage network framework is imagined to be preceded
by a network formation game, in which agents simultaneously propose links while
only have access to limited information about the market.
The model presented here di↵ers in many crucial respects from the literature on
strategic network formation. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) model a dynamic setting
in which the network structure evolves as agents reoptimize their sets of connections
to maximize utility arising from communication across the network, and show that
e cient networks need not be stable in such an environment. Using an implementa-
tion approach, Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) show that this tension can be partially
reconciled in certain settings. Bala and Goyal (1999) characterize of the architecture
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of equilibrium networks in a setting in which agents receive direct benefits from con-
necting to other agents in a network, and receive indirect benefits from neighbors’
neighbors. Analyzing a similar model, Jackson and Rogers (2005) show that the
equilibrium network structures exhibit a certain “small worlds” property, in which
densely connected groups of individuals are connected to other groups by sparse links.
Bridging the gap between the literatures on network formation games and bargaining
on networks, Bloch and Jackson (2007) consider a model with transferable utility in
which agents propose and maintain links to maximize direct and indirect benefits re-
ceived from their network connections. In contrast to these bodies of work, the model
of marriage networks presented herein presents the network formation game as pre-
ceding a formal matching process, and as such provides microeconomic foundations
for utility derived solely from network connections. Within the marriage networks
framework, indirect benefits to connections are received insofar as they impact the
set of network–stable matchings.
The marriage networks model presented here shares many common properties
with that of Arcaute and Vassilvitskii (2009). Whereas this paper focuses on the set
theoretic properties of the sets of network–stable matchings, their work provides a
reinterpretation of the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm of Gale and Shapley (1962)
as a myopic best response dynamic. While providing a similar nesting result on
one set of network–stable matchings and stable matchings to the associated marriage
problem, Arcaute and Vassilvitskii (2009) approach the question from the perspective
of computer science and show that proving the equality of these two sets is NP–
complete.
Chapter 2
Parity Dependence of a Majority
Rule Characterization
2.1 Introduction
Given a set of individuals, N , and a set of feasible alternatives, X, a social choice
rule selects a single alternative from X as a function of individual preferences. May
(1952) characterized majority rule as the unique social welfare function satisfying In-
dependence of Irrelevant Alternatives, Neutrality, Anonymity, and a strong positive
responsiveness axiom, the last of which Maskin (1995) replaced with the Pareto cri-
terion in showing that any social welfare function other than majority rule satisfying
the four axioms will fail to be transitive–valued at some preference profile at which
majority rule is transitive–valued. Using a weaker set of axioms, Campbell and Kelly
(2000) established the same result.
Campbell and Kelly (2003) provide a strategy–proofness characterization of ma-
10
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jority rule as the unique non–dictatorial strategy–proof social choice rule when there
is an odd number of individuals with strict preferences in the Condorcet domain.
Furthermore, they show that when there is an even number of individuals, if a so-
cial choice rule is non–dictatorial and cannot be manipulated by individuals or by
two–individual coalitions, then it is majority rule.
This paper provides two examples of non–dictatorial strategy–proof social choice
rules on the Condorcet domain with an even number of individuals that are distinct
from majority rule. The construction of these examples relies on a key feature of
the preference domain that is parity–dependent: when there is an even number of
individuals, the Condorcet domain can be partitioned into components such that no
individual can change her reported preference ordering in a manner that moves the
reported preference profile from one partition component to another.
To formalize these structural di↵erences, three lemmas are presented that show
respectively the existence of a natural partition of the Condorcet domain, the impli-
cations of this partition for strategy–proofness, and how strategy–proof rules on the
Condorcet domain can be deconstructed into strategy–proof rules on smaller domains
via the partition components. Theorem 2.4.4 employs these lemmas in characterizing
non–dictatorial strategy–proof rules on the Condorcet domain with an even number
of individuals, and Theorem 2.4.11 provides a counterpart to the Campbell and Kelly
(2003) result when n is even. All proofs have been relegated to the appendix.
The Condorcet domain is an admittedly restrictive domain; in particular, it is
worth noting that an individual considering a manipulation is constrained in her ad-
missible reported preferences by the reported preferences of the other individuals.
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Campbell and Kelly (2003) justify consideration of this domain as providing a com-
plement to the Maskin (1995) social welfare function characterization of majority rule.
In the context of this paper, consideration of the Condorcet domain is employed to
illustrate the crucial dependence of the Campbell and Kelly (2003) characterization
of majority rule on the parity of the set of individuals.
The main contribution of this note therefore lies in identifying this dependence
and illustrating through Examples 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 that the characterization does not
hold for an even number of individuals. The axiomatic characterization of non–
dictatorial strategy–proof social choice rules on this domain should be viewed as a
supplementary result meant to formalize the crucial role that parity plays in the
characterization result: when the set of individuals is odd, majority rule is uniquely
non–dictatorial and strategy–proof; when the set of individuals is even, there many
rules satisfying these criteria, of which majority rule is one of the less exotic members.
Section 2.2 formally introduces the notation and terminology. Section 2.3 con-
tains the main contributions of this note, in the form of two examples illustrating
the infeasibility of adapting the Campbell and Kelly (2003) result to the case of an
even number of individuals. Section 2.4 formalizes the intuition developed by the
examples, and presents a result that is analogous to the Campbell and Kelly (2003)
characterization by defining a new social choice rule, quasi–majority rule.
2.2 Notation & Definitions
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of individuals and X = {x, y, z, . . . } a set of feasible
alternatives, with #X ⌘ m   3. Let A(X) denote the set of all complete asymmetric
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binary relations on X, and L(X) ⇢ A(X) the subset of transitive orderings with a
maximal element.
Given a preference profile p 2 L(X)n ⌘ L, let p(i) denote the preference ordering
assigned to i 2 N by p and let x  pi y indicate that i 2 N (strictly) prefers alternative
x 2 X to y 2 X at profile p. Furthermore, let pk(i) denote the k-th ranked alternative
in p(i), with p1(i) denoting individual i’s most–preferred alternative at p.
A social choice rule is a function g : } ! X that selects an alternative in X for
every preference profile p 2 }. Let g|P denote the restriction of g to P ⇢ }, where P
is a subdomain of }.
A social choice rule g : } ! X is dictatorial if there exists i 2 N such that
g(p) = p1(i) for all p 2 }, and is unanimous if g(p) = x whenever p1(i) = x for all
i 2 N . Furthermore, g is manipulable if there exist p, q 2 } and i 2 N such that
p(j) = q(j) for all j 2 N \ {i} and g(q)  pi g(p); that is, if i 2 N can manipulate
g at p via q(i) by reporting q(i). A social choice rule is strategy–proof if it is not
manipulable.
2.2.1 The Condorcet Domain
The results of this paper pertain to a particular set of preference profiles known
as the Condorcet domain. Alternative x is the strong Condorcet winner at profile
p 2 A(X)n if
#{i 2 N : x  pi y} >
n
2
(2.1)
for all y 2 X \ {x}; it is clear that if a strong Condorcet winner exists, it must be
unique.
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Let }C ⇢ A(X)n denote the set of all profiles in A(X)n at which there is a strong
Condorcet winner and LC = }C \ L denote the set of all profiles of linear orders at
which there is a strong Condorcet winner. The sets }C and LC will both be referred
to as the Condorcet domain, when doing so will not create ambiguity. Define the
Condorcet section of x 2 X as the set Cx ⇢ LC for which alternative x 2 X is the
strong Condorcet winner.
2.2.2 Weak Non–Reversal
Eliaz (2004) provides a general impossibility theorem that encompasses those of
Arrow (1951), Gibbard (1973), and Satterthwaite (1975) by defining a class of func-
tions called social aggregators, which includes as special cases both social choice and
welfare rules. The result hinges on the property of preference reversal, introduced by
Eliaz (2004).
Definition 2.2.1 (Eliaz, 2004). A social welfare rule g with domain } satisfies pref-
erence reversal if for every x, y 2 X and every two profiles p, q 2 }, if x  g(p) y and
x  pi y implies x  qi y for all i 2 N , then x  g(q) y.
Campbell and Kelly (2006) utilize a similar definition in establishing a condi-
tion on social welfare functions that is necessary and su cient for the social choice
rule induced by selection the top–ranked alternative from the social ordering to be
invulnerable to manipulation by coalitions, including singleton coalitions.
Definition 2.2.2 (Campbell and Kelly, 2006). A social welfare rule g with domain
} satisfies weak non–reversal if for every x, y 2 X and every profile p 2 }, x  g(p) y
implies that x ⌫g(q) y at all profiles q 2 {s 2 } : 8i 2 N, s(i) 6= p(i)) y  si x}.
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Campbell and Kelly (2006) show that preference reversal is strictly more demand-
ing than weak non–reversal, and note that weighted majority rule satisfies weak non–
reversal but that the Borda rule does not when #X   4.
Within the social choice framework, the non–reversal condition of Campbell and
Kelly (2006) reduces to the following definition.
Definition 2.2.3. A social choice rule g : } ! X satisfies weak non–reversal if
for every x, y 2 X and every profile p 2 }, g(p) = x implies that g(q) 6= y at all
profiles q 2 {s 2 } : 8i 2 N, s(i) 6= p(i)) y  si x}.
From the statement of the definition, it is immediately clear that when the range of
a social choice rule contains only two alternatives, weak non–reversal and strategy–
proofness are logically equivalent. The notion of weak non–reversal is used in the
characterization results of Section 2.4 to link the results of this paper to previous
axiomatic characterizations of strategy–proofness.
2.3 Two Examples
The following example illustrates that the characterization of majority rule due to
Campbell and Kelly (2003) does not hold when there is an even number of individuals.
Example 2.3.1. Let there be an even number of individuals with strict preferences
over the set of alternatives X = {x, y, z}. Define social choice rule g on the Condorcet
domain LC on X as follows: if alternative x 2 X is the Condorcet winner at profile
p 2 LC, then g(p) = y; if y 2 X is the Condorcet winner, then g(p) = z; if z 2 X is
the Condorcet winner, then g(p) = x.
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It is clear that g is neither majority nor dictatorial rule and does not satisfy
unanimity. Moreover, g cannot be manipulated: since n is even, an individual cannot
unilaterally change the strong Condorcet winner within the domain LC , since a single
individual cannot reduce a strict majority to a minority when there is an even number
of individuals.
Note that the social choice rule in Example 2.3.1 is defined over the Condorcet
domain for an odd number of individuals, but is not strategy–proof
The next example shows that requiring a social choice rule to satisfy unanimity
is not su cient to recover the characterization of majority rule when n is even.
Example 2.3.2. Let there be an even number of individuals (n   4) with strict
preferences over the set of alternatives X = {x, y, z}. Define social choice rule g on
the Condorcet domain LC on X as follows: if alternative x 2 X is the Condorcet
winner at profile p 2 LC, g(p) = p1(1); if y 2 X is the Condorcet winner, g(p) =
p1(2); if z 2 X is the Condorcet winner, g(p) = p1(3).
Social choice rule g clearly satisfies unanimity and is non–dictatorial; it is also
strategy–proof, appealing to the same logic as in Example 2.3.1.
The existence of strategy–proof social choice rules in Examples 2.3.1 and 2.3.2
hinges on the ability to define rules piece–wise on distinct Condorcet sections. Lem-
mas 2.4.2 and 2.4.3 establish this feature in greater generality, and are vital to the
characterization of strategy–proof social choice rules in Theorem 2.4.4. It is worth
noting that Examples 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 can be easily extended for any even n   4 and
are well–defined but not strategy–proof on the Condorcet domain with an odd number
of individuals, as there exist preference profiles where individuals can misrepresent
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their preferences to change the Condorcet winner.
2.4 Characterization Results
My main theorem provides a counterpart to the Campbell and Kelly (2003) result
when n is even. As suggested by Examples 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, the Condorcet domain has
a natural partition that can be used to define piecewise strategy–proof social choice
rules when there is an even number of individuals.
Lemma 2.4.1. The set of Condorcet sections, CX , forms a partition of }C.
The result follows immediately from the definition, but is included in Appendix
A.2 for completeness. By construction, there exists a strong Condorcet winner x 2 X
at every preference profile p 2 }x; hence, the members of CX cover }C . Moreover,
since the strong Condorcet winner is unique when it exists, it must be that the
members of CX are disjoint.
It is worth noting that this partition exists independently of the parity of the
set of individuals. However, when there is an even number of individuals, preference
profiles in distinct Condorcet sections must di↵er in the preferences of at least two
individuals. The next lemma formalizes this observation.
Lemma 2.4.2. Suppose that n is even and p 2 Cx for some x 2 X. Then for all
i 2 N and q 2 }C such that q(j) = p(j) for all j 2 N \ {i}, q 2 Cx.
The proof of Lemma 2.4.2 is given in Appendix A.3. The lemma reduces the anal-
ysis of strategy–proofness over the entire Condorcet domain to analysis over arbitrary
Condorcet sections, as the following lemma establishes.
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Lemma 2.4.3. If n is even, then a social choice rule g : }C ! X is strategy–proof if
and only if the restriction g|Cx is strategy–proof for each x 2 X.
The proof of Lemma 2.4.3 is given in Appendix A.4. With these lemmas, I provide
a characterization result.
Theorem 2.4.4. If n > 4 is even and #X   3, then the social choice rule g : LC !
X is strategy–proof if and only if
(i) g|Cx satisfies non–reversal for every subdomain Cx for which #g(Cx) = 2, and;
(ii) g|Cx is dictatorial over the alternatives in g(Cx) for every subdomain Cx for
which #g(Cx)   3.
Propositions 2.4.5, 2.4.6, and 2.4.7 taken collectively provide a proof of Theo-
rem 2.4.4, appealing to Lemma 2.4.3. These propositions characterize, respectively,
strategy–proof social choice rules over Condorcet sections with ranges under g of size
one, two, or three or more.
Proposition 2.4.5. Consider the social choice rule g : LC ! X. If n > 4 is even
and #g(Cx) = 1 for some x 2 X, then g|Cx is strategy–proof.
The proof of Proposition 2.4.5 is trivial, but is provided in Appendix A.5 for
completeness. Clearly any social choice rule is strategy–proof on a domain over which
it has a singleton range; this holds independently of whether x 2 Cx or x 62 Cx. It is
worth noting that majority rule is comprised of this case, with the range over each
Condorcet section being a singleton set containing the strong Condorcet winner.
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Proposition 2.4.6. Consider the social choice rule g : LC ! X. If n > 4 is even
and #g(Cx) = 2 for some x 2 X, then g|Cx is strategy–proof if and only if g satisfies
weak non–reversal.
The proof is available in Appendix A.6, and the result obtains whether x 2 Cx
or x 62 Cx. As noted in Section 2.2.2, this result applies more generally: weak non–
reversal is equivalent to strategy–proofness over any subdomain with a two–element
range.
Proposition 2.4.7. Consider the social choice rule g : LC ! X. A social choice
rule g over Cx with #g(Cx)   3 is strategy–proof if and only if g|Cx is dictatorial with
respect to g(Cx).
Appendix A.7 contains the proof of Proposition 2.4.7. Su ciency is obtained
immediately, since dictatorial rule is strategy–proof. The proof of necessity requires
consideration of two cases: when x 2 Cx and when x 62 Cx.
When x 2 Cx, the structure and content of the proof is similar to that of Campbell
and Kelly (2006), but di↵ers nontrivially at several crucial steps. The full details are
provided for completeness. When x 62 Cx, the proof consists of two steps. In the first
step, the Gibbard–Sattherthwaite theorem is invoked over a subdomain of Cx to show
that if g is strategy–proof on Cx, then g|Cx is be dictatorial with respect to g(Cx). In
the second step, the strategy–proofness of g on Cx is shown to imply that the dictator
over this subdomain must in fact be the dictator over the entire Condorcet section.
The following corollary obtains immediately from Theorem 2.4.4 by requiring g
to satisfy unanimity.
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Corollary 2.4.8. If n > 4 is even and #X   3, then the unanimous social choice
rule g : LC ! X is strategy–proof if and only if
(i) g(Cx) = {x} for every subdomain Cx for which #g(Cx) = 1;
(ii) g|Cx satisfies non–reversal with x 2 g(Cx) and g|Cx(p) = x at all unanimous
p 2 Cx for every subdomain Cx for which #g(Cx) = 2, and;
(iii) g|Cx is dictatorial with respect to alternatives in g(Cx) for every subdomain Cx
for which #g(Cx)   3.
The proof of Corollary 2.4.8 follows directly from Theorem 2.4.4. Unanimity
implies that x 2 Cx, so that g|Cx(p) = x whenever #g(Cx) = 1. When #g(Cx)  
2, the results are fundamentally unchanged save for those implied directly by the
additional assumption of unanimity.
Corollary 2.4.8 demonstrates that requiring g to satisfy unanimity does not mean-
ingfully alter the family of strategy–proof social choice rules over the Condorcet do-
main with an even number of individuals. In particular, it is not su cient to extend
the results of Campbell and Kelly (2006), as demonstrated by Example 2.3.2. How-
ever, an analogous theorem obtains and is expressed concisely with the introduction
of two new definitions.
Definition 2.4.9. Let ⇧ be a partition of LC. Then P 2 ⇧ is a dictatorial section
of social choice rule g : LC ! X on domain LC if P is a Condorcet section and g|P
is dictatorial.
Definition 2.4.10. Let P be a dictatorial section of social choice rule g : LC ! X.
Then g is quasi–majority rule if for all profile p 2 P , if g(p) is not the Condorcet
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winner at p then (i) #g(P ) = 2, one element of which is the Condorcet winner at p,
and (ii) g|P satisfies non–reversal.
With these definitions in place, Theorem 2.4.11 contains the main result.
Theorem 2.4.11. If n > 4 is even and the unanimous social choice rule g : LC ! X
is strategy–proof and has no dictatorial sections, then g is quasi–majority rule.
The proof of Theorem 2.4.11 follows directly from Theorem 2.4.4 and Defini-
tions 2.4.9 and 2.4.10 . If g has no dictatorial sections, the range of g over any Con-
dorcet section Cx must be a singleton or contain exactly two elements. Unanimity
requires that when #g(Cx) = 1, g(Cx) = {x}. The definition of quasi–majority rule
incorporates the non–reversal requirement from Corollary 2.4.8 when #g(Cx) = 2.
2.5 Conclusion
Combining the results of this paper with those of Campbell and Kelly (2003),
yields a complete theory of non–dictatorial strategy–proof social choice rules on the
Condorcet domain for an arbitrary finite number of individuals. Theorem 2.4.11 pro-
vides an analogue to the main result of Campbell and Kelly (2006) and illustrates
the limitation of their characterization of majority rule. As made evident by Ex-
ample 2.3.2, the class of non–dictatorial strategy–proof social choice rules on the
Condorcet domain is much larger when there are an even number of individuals than
when there are an odd number, in which case the class consists solely of majority
rule.
The disparity between the results of this paper and the results of Campbell and
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Kelly (2003) are due to the Condorcet section partition in the case of even number of
individuals. It is this partition that allows for many strategy–proof rules to exist, and
it is the barriers to manipulation between Condorcet sections that cause the method
of proof used in the odd case to fail when applied to the even case. I believe that it
may be possible to unify the results with respect to di↵erent parities of individuals by
expanding the domain. A strong candidate for expansion would be the inclusion of
profiles at which there exist only a weak Condorcet winner; that is, an alternative that
is not strictly defeated by any other alternative in a pair–wise run-o↵. As suggested
by Campbell and Kelly (2003), another possibility is the admission of profiles at which
individuals are indi↵erent between distinct alternatives. It remains an interesting and
open question as to whether a general strategy–proofness characterization of majority
rule can be obtained over the appropriate domain of preference.
Chapter 3
Costly Self–Discovery:
Learning in Quasi–Hyperbolic Agents
3.1 Introduction
Behavioral economics has focused on two main types of agents with time–inconsistent
preferences: naifs and sophisticates. Both types of agents are modeled as a sequence
of autonomous temporal selves indexed by time, with per–period utility functions
characterized by a ( ,  ) pair, where   2 (0, 1) represents the agent’s discounting of
all future periods relative to the current period, and   2 (0, 1) represents the agent’s
discounting between consecutive periods. Na¨ıve agents are unaware of the dynamic
inconsistency of their preferences, and believe that future–period selves will make util-
ity maximizing decisions that coincide with the decision that the current period self
would make for them; that is, they believe that future–period will behave as if   = 1.
Hence, utility–maximizing na¨ıve agents do not choose to employ costly commitment
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mechanisms that restrict the behavior of future–period selves. Sophisticated agents,
on the other hand, recognize that their preferences are dynamically inconsistent and
that without the implementation of commitment mechanisms, future–period selves
will make decisions that are suboptimal with regard to their current–period utility
function.
In infinite–horizon models of costly procrastination, the standard result is for na¨ıve
agents to procrastinate indefinitely and for sophisticated agents to employ a commit-
ment mechanism in which the task is accomplished in the first period. DellaVigna
and Malmendier (2006) o↵er data on health club memberships that do not appear to
support these results. In particular, they observe that
On average, 2.29 full months elapse between the last [instance of health
club] attendance and contract termination for monthly members. [...] This
lag is at least four months for 20 percent of the users.
Additionally, they note that “low–attendance consumers delaying canceling [their
membership]...despite small transaction costs.” That is, agents for whom the main-
tenance of a health club membership is costly relative to their benefits from exercise
(i.e., those who do not frequently use the facilities) maintain their membership for a
significant number of periods. However, even these agents eventually terminate their
membership; in their data on monthly membership uses, over 75% of low–frequency
members terminated their membership within twenty–four periods; for comparison,
roughly one third terminated membership within 12 periods, and over 60% termi-
nated their membership within 18 periods. As DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006)
note, “observed consumer behavior is di cult to reconcile with standard preferences
and beliefs.”
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Where DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) propose a model of overconfidence in
future self–control, this paper proposes a model of learning in which a learning–na¨ıve
agent slowly moves from na¨ıve–type optimization behavior to sophisticated–type op-
timization behavior by experiencing stochastic per period shocks to her utility func-
tions. The learning–na¨ıve agent is initially uncertain about the value of   that enters
into the utility functions of her past– and future–period selves, but holds prior beliefs
µ1 about the value,  ˆ. By observing the stochastic shocks and action choices of past
selves, the learning–na¨ıve agent is able to update her beliefs about the value of  ˆ, the
quasi–hyperbolic discount factor of her past– and future–period selves. Given su -
ciently many periods and su cient variation in the stochastic shocks, the equilibrium
behavior of the learning–na¨ıve agent eventually converges to that of the sophisticated
agent: when the parameters of the model are such that the sophisticated agent would
employ a commitment mechanism, the learning–na¨ıve agent will eventually do the
same.
Section 3.2 proceeds with a discussion of the state of the literature on time–
inconsistent preferences and learning in behavioral agents, with a particular focus on
the model of Ali (2011). Section 3.3 presents a simple behavioral learning model,
and provides analytic comparisons of the equilibrium behavior of the standard na¨ıve
and sophisticated agents in relation to the newly defined learning–na¨ıve agent. A
numerical example is provided and simulated in Mathematica, to concretely illustrate
the di↵erences in equilibrium behavior between the three types of behavioral agents.
Finally, Section 3.4 concludes.
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3.2 Learning in Behavioral Agents
The bulk of the literature on time–inconsistent preferences has focused on two
distinct types of agents: the sophisticated agent, who fully recognizes her future
self–control problems, and the na¨ıve agent, who completely fails to recognize her
future self–control problems. Building on the notion of time–inconsistent preferences
originally developed by Phelps and Pollak (1968) and later formalized by Laibson
(1994) and Barro (1999), O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) propose a model in which a
new type of agent, a partially–na¨ıve agent with quasi–hyperbolic discount parameters
( ,  ), believes with probability one that her future selves will instead optimize with
respect to the quasi–hyperbolic discount factor is  ˆ 2 ( , 1). From this modeling
perspective, the na¨ıve agent can be viewed as putting unit probability on future
selves optimizing with respect to  ˆ = 1, whereas the sophisticated agent puts unit
probability on the true value of the quasi–hyperbolic discount factor,  .
In the setting of O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001), the partially–na¨ıve agent faces
a choice problem in a setting in which procrastination abounds. In particular, they
show that an agent may be more likely to procrastinate in pursuit of important
goals than in pursuit of unimportant ones, since the decision to pursue a task is
based on its long–run benefit whereas the decision to complete the task is based on
its immediate cost. By restricting attention to a newly defined class of strategies
denoted perception–perfect strategies, O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) are able to show
that in any fixed choice environment, severe procrastination can occur only with a
non–negligible degree of naivete´; that is, when  ˆ    . However, for any degree of
naivete´, there exists a choice environment in which the agent procrastinates severely.
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These results generalize in a choice framework those of O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999),
who showed that even mild self–control problems, that is, those for which   ! 1, can
cause severe procrastination in the completely na¨ıve agent but not in the completely
sophisticated agent.
Assessing the state of the behavioral economics literature on time–inconsistent
preferences, Fudenberg (2006) remarks,
I think that behavioral economics would be well served by concerted at-
tempts to provide learning–theoretic (or any other) foundations for its
equilibrium concepts. At the least, this process might provide a better un-
derstanding of when the currently used concepts apply.
Seeking to satisfy this aim through a model in which an agent’s beliefs about the utility
maximization undertaken by her future–period selves are not exogenously given, Ali
(2011) proposes a model in which an agent who is only partially aware of her future
temptations learns of them over time. In particular, this framework is in contrast to
the modeling of O’Donoghue and Rabin’s (2001) partially–na¨ıve agent, for whom the
belief that future–period selves optimize with respect to  ˆ is exogenously given and
fixed throughout the infinite–horizon decision problem. As suggested by Ali (2011),
endogenizing beliefs in this way allows one to pose and answer the ques-
tion of whether and when sophistication closely approximates the decision
maker’s self–awareness once he has had many opportunities to learn.
Rather than a setting of procrastination, Ali (2011) models an environment in
which the dynamically inconsistent agent faces temptation. In particular, the agent
is modeled in the dual–self Doer/Planner framework of Fudenberg and Levine (2006),
with each period in the infinite horizon decision problem broken into two sub–periods.
In the first sub–period, the forward–looking rational Planner chooses a menu from
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which the Doer will select an alternative; in the second sub–period, the temptation–
prone Doer observes a realization of a stochastic shock to the agent’s utility function
and then chooses from the menu selected by the Doer. Within this context, there is a
direct tension between desire for flexibility and the desire for commitment: the Plan-
ner is uncertain about the extent to which the Doer is able to resist temptation, but
must select the menu prior to the realization of the agent’s period–specific stochastic
taste shock.
Learning in Ali (2011) therefore requires costly experimentation, as the Planner
only learns about the Doer’s level of self–control when she chooses a flexible menu that
exposes the Doer to temptation. This model implies that in the limit, the Planner
can only have incorrect beliefs about the Doer’s self–control when she believes the
Doer to be more subject to temptation than she in truth is; the Planner cannot
perpetually overestimate the Doer’s ability to resist temptation. However, if the
Planner becomes su ciently pessimistic about the Doer’s self–control problem, she
may select a singleton menu that fully commits the Doer to a single alternative. Since
learning does not occur when the Doer does not face temptation, overly pessimistic
beliefs concerning the Doer’s ability to resist temptation may exist in perpetuity so
long as the Planner pre–commits the Doer via menu selection. Ali (2011) presents a
su cient condition on the set of partial commitments, or menu choices, under which
learning engenders sophistication.
In the next section, a model of learning is presented in the context of a single
self quasi–hyperbolic agent facing an infinite horizon decision problem. Whereas Ali
(2011) focuses on an environment in which temptation is the primarily embodiment
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of dynamically inconsistent preferences, the model presented in Section 3.3 presents
an environment in which dynamic inconsistency presents itself as procrastination.
Combining model elements from O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) and Ali (2011), the
model introduces a new type of agent, the learning–na¨ıve agent with quasi–hyperbolic
discount parameters ( ,  ) and initial beliefs µ1 about the value  ˆ of the quasi–
hyperbolic discount factor used by her future–period selves. Unlike the modeling
environment of the na¨ıve and sophisticated agents, but similar to that of the dual
self agent of Ali (2011), the learning–na¨ıve agent faces an infinite–period decision
problem with period–specific stochastic shocks to her utility. In the spirit of Be´nabou
and Tirole (2004), the learning–na¨ıve agent looks to her own past behavior to infer
how she is likely to behave in the future. Whereas the standard behavioral types
and the partially–na¨ıve agent agent of O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) repeatedly
fail to reconcile their past behavior with their beliefs and former predictions of said
behavior, the learning–na¨ıve agent utilizes implemented actions resulting from the
stochastic shocks to her utility function to update her beliefs about the behavior of
her future–selves.
An important features of the model is the quasi–Bayesian nature of the learning–
na¨ıve agent’s beliefs and updating process; in particular, the agent does not take
into consideration the learning of future–period selves when updating her current–
period beliefs and optimizing her planned sequence of actions. In particular, this
is in contrast to the self–signaling models of Bodner and Prelec (1997, 2002) and
Be´nabou and Tirole (2004), as the current–period learning–na¨ıve agent does not take
into consideration the impact that her actions will have on the beliefs of future–period
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selves regarding her tendency to procrastinate. Similar to the Doer/Planner agent of
Ali (2011), the learning–na¨ıve agent cannot be perpetually overly optimistic about
the procrastination problem faced by her future–period selves; Theorem 3.3.1 contains
this primary result.
The models of Ali (2011) and Section 3.3 present an environment in which agents
with time–inconsistent preferences are able to learn about their susceptibility to
temptation and procrastination, respectively. Both models are agnostic about the
implications of this context–dependent learning on self–awareness more broadly. In
particular, does learning about one’s inclination to procrastinate completing an im-
portant task confer learning about one’s ability to resist temptation? On an even
finer grid, if an individual learns that she is susceptible to the temptations of choco-
late despite her resolve to eat healthily, does she also learn about her susceptibility
to the temptation of cigarettes despite her resolve to quit smoking? The models of
Ali (2011) and Section 3.3 aim at providing learning–theoretic justification for the
frequently used equilibrium assumption of sophistication; in addition to developing
more satisfying and generalizable models of learning for time–inconsistent agents, it
remains an interesting and open question as to how learning about   in one choice
domain impacts beliefs about   in other domains.
3.3 A Simple Self–Learning Model
In this section, a simple model of self–learning by quasi–hyperbolic agents is pro-
posed in a setting wherein agents are tempted to procrastinate. The model is meant
to illustrate the primary features that behavioral self–learning model must possess;
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Subsection 3.3.6 concludes the section with a discussion of the di cult modeling issues
inherent to self–learning.
3.3.1 Notation & Definitions
Consider an infinite–horizon decision problem in which an agent enrolled in a
health club membership must choose an action from the set
A =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
Exercise Membership (E),
Maintain Membership (M),
Terminate Membership (T)
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
. (3.1)
If the membership is terminated in period t, the decision set of every subsequent
period is the null set and the agent’s continuation payo↵ is assumed to be zero. For
notational convenience, let d (t) = (d1, d2, . . . , dt 1) denote the sequence of realized
actions terminating in period t 1, and let d+(t) = (dt, dt+2, . . . ) denote the sequence
of planned actions beginning in period t.
Agents are modeled as a sequence of autonomous temporal selves indexed by time
t 2 {1, 2, 3, . . . } with quasi–hyperbolic utility functions
Ut(d
 (t), d+(t)) ⌘ [⇡(dt 1) + C(dt)] +  
 1X
i=1
 i [⇡(dt 1+i) + C(dt+i)]
!
, (3.2)
where  ,   2 [0, 1], and ⇡(dt) and C(dt) are the agent’s instantaneous benefit and cost
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functions, defined by
⇡(dt) =
8>>><>>>:
b, if dt = E
0, otherwise
(3.3)
and
C(dt) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
cM , if dt = M
cT , if dt = T
cE, if dt = E.
(3.4)
In each period t, the current–period self choses an action plan d+(t) subject to
her history of realized decisions d (t) that solves
max
d+(t)
(
[⇡(dt 1) + C(dt)] +  
 1X
i=1
 i [⇡(dt 1+i) + C(dt+i)]
!)
. (3.5)
Membership is assumed to be automatically renewing, so that the agent incurs a
loss cM < 0 in every period during which the membership is maintained but unused.
During periods when the membership is exercised, the agent incurs an immediate
loss cE < cM attributable to the membership fee and the time and energy costs of
exercising. It is assumed that terminating the membership incurs an immediate loss
of cT , where cE < cT < cM < 0, which is attributable to the time cost of filing the
appropriate paperwork.
Exercising the membership is assumed to be beneficial, in that exercising in period
t delivers a benefit b > 0 in period t + 1. Of particular interest is the parameter
space in which cE +  b > 0 but cE +   b < cM . When these assumptions hold
the observed equilibrium behavior of na¨ıve and sophisticated agents di↵er, as the
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following subsections illustrate.
3.3.2 Behavioral Equilibria for the Na¨ıve Agent
Consider first a na¨ıve agent whose period–t utility maximization problem during
a period of active membership is given by
max
d+(t)
(
[⇡(dt 1) + C(dt)] +  
 1X
i=1
 i [⇡(dt 1+i) + C(dt+i)]
!)
, (3.6)
but who believes that future period selves will solve
max
d+(t)
(
[⇡(dt 1) + C(dt)] +
 1X
i=1
 i [⇡(dt 1+i) + C(dt+i)]
!)
. (3.7)
That is, the na¨ıve agent incorrectly believes that her future selves maximize a purely
hyperbolic utility function, when in fact they optimize the same quasi–hyperbolic
utility function as the current–period self. If the agent has terminated her membership
in a previous period, the maximization is trivial and the agent receives a continuation
payo↵ of zero in every subsequent period.
In period–t, the agent believes that her future selves solve
max
d+(⌧)
(
[⇡(d⌧ 1) + C(d⌧ )] +
 1X
i=1
 i [⇡(d⌧ 1+i) + C(d⌧+i)]
!)
, (3.8)
which is maximized by the future action plan d+(⌧) = (E,E,E, . . . ) regardless of
past actions, since cT < cM < 0 < cE +  b by assumption. Anticipating that future
selves will choose to exercise the membership in every period regardless of her current
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period action, the na¨ıve period–t agent believes her optimization problem to collapse
to
max {cE +   b, cM , cT}, (3.9)
corresponding to the utility realized from exercising, maintaining, or terminating
membership in the current period, respectively. Since cT < cM and cE +   b < cM ,
the na¨ıve agent maximizes anticipated utility in every period t by choosing the future
action plan d+(t) = (M,E,E, . . . ).
In this parameter space, the observed equilibrium behavior of a na¨ıve agent
exemplifies procrastination: in every period, the current–period self optimizes au-
tonomously as a  –  discounter by maintaining membership, believing that future–
period selves will optimize as pure hyperbolic discounters and exercise the member-
ship. For every t < 1, the sequence of realized past actions is therefore given by
d (t) = (M,M, . . . ). Therefore, the present–discounted equilibrium payo↵ to the
na¨ıve agent is given by
cM +  
1X
i=1
 icM =
✓
1    +   
1   
◆
cM . (3.10)
3.3.3 Behavioral Equilibria for the Sophisticated Agent
The sophisticated agent recognizes that in every period, her current–period self
will solve the utility maximization problem
max
d+(t)
(
[⇡(dt 1) + C(dt)] +  
 1X
i=1
 i [⇡(dt 1+i) + C(dt+i)]
!)
, (3.11)
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and that by allowing each future self to optimize autonomously, her flow–utility in
every period will be cM < 0, as in each period the current–period self will selfishly
choose to forgo exercising or terminating in favor of maintaining the membership.
The sophisticated agent will therefore seek a commitment mechanism to restrict
the behavior of future selves whenever such a mechanism can be employed at su -
ciently low cost; within the context of the proposed health club membership model,
membership termination serves as such a commitment device. Two classes of equi-
libria of are particular interest: pure–strategy alternating termination equilibria, in
which the agent terminates in the first period along the equilibrium path but delays
termination for k periods if termination does not occur as planned, and probabilistic
per–period termination equalibria, in which the agent terminates membership with
probability p in every period, conditional on not having terminated in the past.
Alternating Termination Equilibria (ATE). Suppose that the sophisticated
agent, recognizing her procrastination problem, employs a strategy in which she ter-
minates her membership immediately along the equilibrium path; if she does not
terminate her membership in the first period, she maintains membership for k peri-
ods, at which point the strategy repeats. Under such an equilibrium it is assumed
that the informational structure is such that every agent knows the action prescribed
to them by the equilibrium, so that if the equilibrium strategy prescribes to the first
period self membership termination but to the second period self membership main-
tenance, the second period self knows that she is to maintain membership should she
have the opportunity to play. For the proposed equilibrium behavior to be incentive
compatible for the first–period self to whom the proposed strategy assigns the action
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of terminating membership, the delay length k must be chosen so that
cT   cM +  
"
kX
i=1
 icM +  
k+1cT
#
, (3.12)
which implies that the payo↵ to terminating immediately is greater than the payo↵ to
maintaining the membership for k additional periods before terminating. Moreover,
the payo↵ to terminating immediately is greater than the payo↵ to exercising in
the current period, given the equilibrium strategies of the future–period selves, since
cE +   b < cM and Equation 3.12 imply that
cT > cE +  
"
 b+
kX
i=1
 icM +  
k+1cT
#
. (3.13)
Note that since the decision problem is stationary conditional on membership having
never been terminated in the past, the above condition insures incentive compatibility
in periods t 2 {1, k + 2, 2k + 3, 3k + 4, . . . }; that is, the above condition on k implies
incentive compatibility for each agent to whom the proposed equilibrium strategy
assigns the action of terminating membership.
Incentive compatibility of the proposed equilibrium in periods immediately fol-
lowing a period in which termination is prescribed by the equilibrium requires that k
be such that
cM +  
"
k 1X
i=1
 icM +  
kcT
#
  cT , (3.14)
so that the payo↵ to terminating immediately is less than the payo↵ to maintaining
the membership for k   1 additional periods. Note that, as before, the assumption
that cE +   b < cM insures that the payo↵ to exercising in the current period is also
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less than the payo↵ to maintaining membership. Satisfaction of the incentive com-
patibility constraints in periods immediately following those in which termination
is prescribed guarantees satisfaction of these constraints in all periods when mem-
bership maintenance is prescribed: since the number of periods until termination is
declining after each period following a period of prescribed termination, the implied
cost of further delaying termination is highest for the agent who acts in the period
immediately following a period of prescribed termination. From Equation 3.14 this
implication is obvious, since cT < cM < 0 and the length of the summation decreases
for each subsequent agent in the maintenance sequence. Since the cost of terminating
is fixed and the cost of delaying termination is therefore declining, any k that satisfies
Equation 3.14 will satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints of all other agents
to whom the proposed equilibrium strategy prescribes maintaining the membership.
Following the previous paragraphs, an alternating termination equilibrium exists
for the sophisticated agent whenever there exists k 2 N satisfying
(1) cT   cM +  
kX
i=1
 icM +   
k+1cT , and
(2) cT  cM +  
k 1X
i=1
 icM +   
kcT .
In specific applications, the existence of such equilibria could be verified numerically
from assumed or estimated termination and maintenance costs, and the discount
factors   and  .
In an alternating termination equilibrium as described above, the sophisticated
agent terminates her membership immediately along the equilibrium path. Therefore,
the present–discounted payo↵ to the sophisticated agent resulting from this equilib-
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rium strategy is given by cT . The agent will therefore employ membership termination
via an alternating termination equilibrium as a commitment mechanism whenever
cT  
✓
1    +   
1   
◆
cM . (3.15)
Note from Equation 3.26 that the sophisticated agent is more likely to utilize the
commitment mechanism whenever (1) cT < 0 increases, so that the immediate cost
of terminating declines; (2) cM < 0 decreases, so that the per–period cost of not
terminating increases; (3)   or   increase, so that the agent becomes more patient.
See Appendix B.1 for verification of the relationship between commitment mechanism
usage and patience.
Probabilistically Terminating Equilibria (PTE). Suppose that the sophisti-
cated agent, recognizing her procrastination problem, instead employs a strategy in
which she terminates her membership with some fixed probability p 2 (0, 1) in every
period, conditional on never having terminated her membership in the past. For the
proposed equilibrium to be incentive compatible, it must be that the expected payo↵
to maintaining membership in the current period is equal to the expected payo↵ to
terminating in the current period. That is, p must be chosen so that
cT = cM +  
1X
i=1
 i(1  p)i[pcT + (1  p)cM ], (3.16)
or, equivalently, to solve the quadratic
  (cT   cM)p2 +  (cT   cM    [cT   2cM ])p+ (1   )(cT   cM)    cM = 0. (3.17)
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Since cE +   b < cM by assumption, it follows that the current–period agent
cannot profitably deviate to any strategy that puts positive weight on exercising in the
current period, given the equilibrium strategies of future selves. That is, the current–
period self cannot profitably deviate from the proposed equilibrium strategy. As with
the alternating termination equilibria, the existence of a probabilistic terminating
equilibrium could be verified in a specific application by numerically calculating p in
Equation 3.16 from assumed or estimated termination and maintenance costs, and
the discount factors   and  .
In a probabilistically terminating equilibrium as described above, the sophisti-
cated agent terminates her membership after a finite number of periods along the
equilibrium path, where the number of periods until termination is distributed geo-
metrically with parameter p. Therefore, the present–discounted expected payo↵ to
the sophisticated agent resulting from this equilibrium strategy is given by
pcT + (1  p)cM +  
1X
i=1
 i(1  p)i[pcT + (1  p)cM ]. (3.18)
The agent will therefore employ membership termination via a probabilistically ter-
minating equilibrium as a commitment mechanism whenever
pcT + (1  p)cM +  
1X
i=1
 i(1  p)i[pcT + (1  p)cM ]  
✓
1    +   
1   
◆
cM , (3.19)
where p is chosen so as to satisfy Equation 3.16.
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3.3.4 Behavioral Equilibria for the Learning–Na¨ıve Agent
In addition to the standard behavioral agent types (naifs and sophisticates), con-
sider a learning–na¨ıve agent endowed with beliefs concerning the utility function her
past and future selves maximize. In particular, suppose that in the initial period
the learning–na¨ıve agent knows that her current period self maximizes utility with
respect to the quasi–hyperbolic parameters ( ,  ), but has beliefs µ about the value
 ˆ of the quasi–hyperbolic discount factor entering into the utility calculation of her
past– and future–selves. Note that the initial beliefs of a learning–na¨ıve agent can be
made arbitrary close to those of a na¨ıve agent in the following sense: for any ✏ 2 (0, 1)
there exists µ with full support on (0, 1) such that 1  ✏ < Eµ[ ˆ] < 1.
Unlike the modeling framework in which na¨ıve and sophisticated agents reside,
learning–na¨ıve agents reside in a modeling framework that permits learning about the
value of the quasi–hyperbolic discount factor that enters the utility calculations of past
and future selves through stochastic shocks to the benefit of exercising membership
services. At the beginning of each period, the learning–na¨ıve agent realizes a next–
period benefit to exercise b of the random variable B with probability density function
f on [0,1], so that the instantaneous benefit function is given by
⇡(dt, bt) =
8>>><>>>:
bt, if dt = E
0, otherwise.
(3.20)
These shocks can be though to reflect exogenous factors that e↵ect the benefit to
exercising membership services but do not influence membership maintenance or ter-
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minations costs. In the case of health club membership, these fluctuations might
reflect daily changes in diet and physical activity that compliment or substitute for
the use of health club services.
The decision problem facing the learning–na¨ıve agent therefore proceeds as follows:
at the beginning of period t of active membership, the agent’s beliefs are updated in
a quasi–Bayesian fashion conditional on the observed action and stochastic benefit to
exercising from the previous period, (dt 1, bt 1). The period–t agent believes that her
previous period self would have exercised her membership if and only if the discounted
benefits exceed the cost; that is, if and only if
cE +  ˆ bt   0 ,  ˆ    cE
 bt
. (3.21)
Therefore, having observed dt 1 = E, the period–t agent updates her beliefs about  ˆ
according to
µt(x) ⌘ µt 1(x|dt 1 = E, bt 1)
=
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
0, if 0  x   cE
 bt 1
µt 1(x)Z 1
 cE/ bt 1
µt 1(y)dy
, if
 cE
 bt 1
< x  1.
(3.22)
Chapter 3: Costly Self–Discovery 42
Similarly, after observing dt 1 = M the agent updates her beliefs according to
µt(x) ⌘ µt 1(x|dt 1 = M, bt 1)
=
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
µt 1(x)Z  cE/ bt 1
0
µt 1(y)dy
, if 0  x   cE
 bt 1
0, if
 cE
 bt 1
< x  1.
(3.23)
Having updated her beliefs, µt, the agent observes a realization bt of the next–
period benefits to exercising her membership and then maximizes her current period
utility by solving
max
d+(t)
(
[⇡(dt 1, bt 1) + C(dt)] +  
 1X
i=1
 i [⇡(dt 1+i,Ef [bt 1+i]) + C(dt+i)]
!)
(3.24)
subject to her belief that all future selves will maximize utility by solving
max
d+(⌧)
(
[⇡(d⌧ 1, b⌧ 1) + C(d⌧ )] + Eµt [ ˆ]
 1X
i=1
 i [⇡(d⌧ 1+i,Ef [b⌧ 1+i]) + C(d⌧+i)]
!)
,
(3.25)
where Ef [bt] is the degenerate distribution that puts unit mass on the realized benefit
bt observed by the agent at the beginning of period t, and Eµ⌧ [ ˆ] is the expected value
of the quasi–hyperbolic discount factor used by past– and future–period selves taken
with respect to period–t believes µt.
When deciding whether or not to terminate membership in period–t, the learning–
na¨ıve agent compares her beliefs about the value of the quasi–hyperbolic discount fac-
tor used by past– and future–period selves to an exogenously determined benchmark
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 ¯ derived from the observed equilibrium behavior of the sophisticated agent. When
Eµt [ ˆ] <  ¯, the learning–na¨ıve agent terminates her membership, anticipating that
future–selves will ine ciently maintain membership as a result of their (partially) un-
recognized procrastination incentive. Natural benchmark  –values are those at which
the sophisticated agent is indi↵erent between utilizing a commitment mechanism via
either an alternating termination equilibrium or a probabilistically terminating equi-
librium. In the health club membership model, these benchmarks are given by  ¯A
and  ¯P respectively, and following Equations 3.26 and 3.19 are given by
cT =
✓
1    +  ¯A 
1   
◆
cM . (3.26)
and
pcT + (1  p)cM +  ¯P
1X
i=1
 i(1  p)i[pcT + (1  p)cM ] =
✓
1    +  ¯P  
1   
◆
cM , (3.27)
respectively.
It is important to note that the learning–na¨ıve agent is not fully Bayesian in three
fundamental respects. First, the agent fails to fully recognize that her past behavior
is at odds with her beliefs about the utility functions of her past– and future–selves;
this particular feature of the learning–na¨ıve agent is also exhibited by the na¨ıve agent
who, despite a history of maintained membership, consistently maintains member-
ship in accordance with her belief that her future selves will exercise membership.
Secondly, the agent does not anticipate learning by her future selves when forecast-
ing their utility–maximizing behavior. That is, she believes that all future–period
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selves will believe that all other future–period selves will optimize with respect to
quasi–hyperbolic discount factor Eµt [ ˆ], even though the agent will update her beliefs
about the quasi–hyperbolic discount factor being used by future–period selves at the
beginning of period–(t+ 1). Finally, when choosing whether or not to terminate her
membership, the learning–na¨ıve agent ignores the option value of maintaining club
membership for utilization during periods when the gains to exercising are excep-
tionally large. In particular, the agent uses benchmark  –values arising from the
non–stochastic environment of the sophisticated agent to inform her decision in an
environment with stochastic benefits.
Within this environment, the observed equilibrium behavior of the learning–na¨ıve
agent bridges those of the na¨ıve and sophisticated agents when the parameters of the
model are such that the sophisticated agent would utilize a commitment mechanism,
as Theorem 3.3.1 provides.
Theorem 3.3.1. For any µ1 with full support on (0, 1), if f has full support on✓ cE
  
,
 cE
 
◆
and     ¯, the learning–na¨ıve agent will terminate her membership in
finite time.
The proof of Theorem 3.3.1 follows in a straightforward fashion from well–known
results about the convergence of beliefs under Bayesian updating, but available in
Appendix B.2 for completeness. Theorem 3.3.1 provides conditions under which the
equilibrium behavior of the learning–na¨ıve agent will eventually mimic that of the
sophisticated agent, for initial beliefs that are arbitrarily close to those of the na¨ıve
agent. That is, regardless of the initial level of naivete´, the learning–na¨ıve agent
learns of her tendency to procrastinate su ciently quickly that she will optimally
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terminate her membership within a finite number of periods with probability one.
Subsection 3.3.5 presents a numerical example, in which the equilibrium behavior
of the na¨ıve and sophisticated agents can be directly compared to the stimulated
behavior of the learning–na¨ıve agent.
3.3.5 A Numerical Example
Following the empirical analysis of DellaVigna and Malmendier (2005), consider
a health club in which members must pay a weekly membership fee of $17 in order
to have access to club equipment and services. Exercising costs an additional $8
per week in time spent exercising and commuting, but delivers health benefits in the
next week equivalent to $60. The gym membership renews automatically, so that
the agent is charged the monthly fee unless she choses to terminate her membership.
Termination costs $20 in time spent speaking to a customer service representative.1
Agents are assumed to have quasi–hyperbolic preferences, with parameters   = 14
and   = 12 . In the notation of Subsection 3.3.1,
⇡(dt) =
8>>><>>>:
60, if dt = E
0, otherwise
(3.28)
1In particular, DellaVigna and Malmendier (2005) report that the average monthly membership
in their sample costs just under $70 per month, or approximately $17 per week. Additionally,
they estimate a termination cost of at least $15, which they attribute to the opportunity cost and
mental cost of filing the appropriate paperwork. The costs in this example assume an additional
transportation cost of $3 per week to commute to and from the health club, as well as an additional
$5 per week opportunity cost for time spent exercising.
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and
C(dt) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
 17, if dt = M
 20, if dt = T
 25, if dt = E.
(3.29)
Moreover, the numerical values of the parameters meet the criteria established; that
is,
cE +  b ⌘  25 + 1
2
(60) = 5 > 0 (3.30)
and
cE +   b ⌘  25 + 1
4
✓
1
2
◆
(60) =  17.5 <  17 ⌘ cM . (3.31)
Following the derivations of Subsection 3.3.2, in equilibrium the na¨ıve agent main-
tains membership in every period, earning a present–discounted equilibrium payo↵
of ✓
1    +   
1   
◆
cM =  $21.25. (3.32)
As in Subsection 3.3.3, the sophisticated agent may display two distinct equilibrium
behaviors. An alternating termination equilibria with delay length k exists if an
integer k can be chosen such that
cT   cM +  
kX
i=1
 icM +   
k+1cT
,  20   1
4
(72 k   85)
,  0.376  k,
(3.33)
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and
cT  cM +  
k 1X
i=1
 icM +   
kcT
,  20  72 k 1   85
4
,  1.052   k.
(3.34)
Since there exists no k 2 N satisfying both of the inequalities above, an alternating
termination equilibrium does not exist for the sophisticated agent for the parame-
ters of this problem. A probabilistically terminating equilibrium exists if there is a
termination probability p 2 (0, 1) that solves
cT = cM +  
1X
i=1
 i(1  p)i[pcT + (1  p)cM ]
,  20 =  95 + 34p+ 7p
2
4 + 4p
, p = 23  2
p
106
7
⇡ 0.344.
(3.35)
Therefore, within the numerical example given at the beginning of this section, the
sophisticated agent displays a probabilistically terminating equilibria in which she
terminates her membership with probability p ⇡ 0.344 in every period conditional on
never having terminated in the past, earning a present–discounted expected equilib-
rium payo↵ of
pcT+(1 p)cM+ 
1X
i=1
 i(1 p)i[pcT+(1 p)cM ] = 52
p
106  2943
119
⇡  $20.23. (3.36)
Note that, as expected, the sophisticated agent is able to guarantee herself a payo↵
that exceeds that of the na¨ıve agent by availing herself to the commitment mechanism
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embodied by membership termination.
Following Subsection 3.3.4, consider a learning–na¨ıve agent with true quasi–hyperbolic
utility parameters   = 14 and   =
1
2 , but with initial beliefs µ1 about  ˆ, the quasi–
hyperbolic utility parameter that enters the utility function of her past and future
selves. For simplicity, suppose that
µ1(x) =
8>>><>>>:
1
100 , if 0  x  9899
4901
50 , if
98
99 < x  1,
(3.37)
for x 2 [0, 1], which implies that Eµ1 [ ˆ] = 0.99 so that the learning–na¨ıve agent has
initial beliefs very similar to those of a na¨ıve agent. Moreover, suppose that stochastic
shocks to the benefit of exercising membership services are distributed according to
the shifted exponential distribution,
f(x) =
1
10
exp

50  x
10
 
. (3.38)
Given the distribution of shocks, having observed dt 1 = E, the period–t learning–
na¨ıve agent updates her beliefs about  ˆ at the beginning of period–t according to
µt(x) ⌘ µt 1(x|dt 1 = E, bt 1)
=
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
0, if 0  x  50bt 1
µt 1(x)Z 1
50/bt 1
µt 1(y)dy
, if 50bt 1 < x  1.
(3.39)
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Similarly, after observing dt 1 = M the agent updates her beliefs according to
µt(x) ⌘ µt 1(x|dt 1 = M, bt 1)
=
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
µt 1(x)Z 50/bt 1
0
µt 1(y)dy
, if 0  x  50bt 1
0, if 50bt 1 < x  1.
(3.40)
Having updated her beliefs, the learning–na¨ıve agent observes a draw bt from B and
maximizes her expected utility by solving
max
d+(t)
(
[⇡(dt 1, bt 1) + C(dt)] +
1
4
 1X
i=1
1
2i
[⇡(dt 1+i,Ef [bt 1+i]) + C(dt+i)]
!)
(3.41)
subject to her belief that all future selves will maximize utility by solving
max
d+(⌧)
(
[⇡(d⌧ 1, b⌧ 1) + C(d⌧ )] + Eµt [ ˆ]
 1X
i=1
1
2i
[⇡(d⌧ 1+i,Ef [b⌧ 1+i]) + C(d⌧+i)]
!)
,
(3.42)
where Ef [bt] is the degenerate distribution that puts unit mass on the realized benefit
bt observed by the agent at the beginning of period t, and Eµ⌧ [ ˆ] is the expected value
of the quasi–hyperbolic discount factor used by past– and future–period selves taken
with respect to period–t believes µt.
When deciding whether or not to terminate membership, the learning–na¨ıve agent
compares her beliefs about the value of the quasi–hyperbolic discount factor used by
past– and future–period selves to an exogenously chosen benchmark derived from
the observed equilibrium behavior of the sophisticated agent. Since an alternating
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termination equilibrium does not exist for the parameters of this numerical example,
the relevant benchmark is the  –value at which sophisticated agent is indi↵erent be-
tween employing a probabilistically terminating equilibrium to serve as a commitment
mechanism and incurring the cost of indefinitely maintaining membership. That is,
the relevant benchmark against which to compare Eµ⌧ [ ˆ] is given by
pcT + (1  p)cM +  ¯P
1X
i=1
 i(1  p)i[pcT + (1  p)cM ] =
✓
1    +  ¯P  
1   
◆
cM
, 3456  278
p
106 + 4(59
p
106  535) ¯P
7(
p
106  15) =  17
✓
1 +  ¯P
4
◆
,  ¯P = 3(53
p
106  557)
5(71
p
106  785)
⇡ 0.126.
(3.43)
where p is given by Equation 3.35.
The stochastic environment of the learning–na¨ıve agent was simulated in Mathe-
matica, and the simulation code is available in Appendix B.3. Averaging over 1,000
simulation runs, the learning–na¨ıve agent agent maintained her membership for an
average of 180 but a median of only 3 periods before terminating. The learning–na¨ıve
agent therefore earns a present–discounted expected equilibrium payo↵ bounded be-
low by
cM +  
⇥
 cM +  
2cM +  
3cT
⇤
=  333
16
⇡  $20.81, (3.44)
which is less than the present–discounted expected equilibrium payo↵ to the sophis-
ticated agent under the probabilistically terminating equilibrium but greater than
the present–discounted equilibrium payo↵ to the na¨ıve agent. Depending on the
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µ1(x) =
(
0.01, 0  x  0.99
98.02, 0.99 < x  1
Figure 3.1: Probability Density Function for Simulated µ1(x).
implemented per–period actions and the realized stochastic benefit to exercising,
the realized present–discounted expected equilibrium payo↵ of the median learning–
na¨ıve agent is unbounded, since the distribution of benefits has infinite support.
Tables 3.3.5–3.3.5 illustrate the path of beliefs for single simulation, in which eight
periods passed before termination. The benchmark  ˆ is illustrated in red.
3.3.6 Modeling Issues & Alternative Assumptions
Like many of the behavioral learning models discussed in Section 3.2, the model of
Section 3.3 is built upon several assumptions with which ideal models could dispense
without unduly compromising the analytic tractability or obscuring the intuition of
the model. First and foremost, the period–t learning–na¨ıve agent forgets the parame-
ters of the utility function maximized in the previous period: despite the fact that the
true value of   entered the utility calculation of the period–(t  1) self, the current–
period self believes all past–selves to have maximized with respect to Eµt [ ˆ]. This
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µ2(x) =
8><>:
0, 0  x  0.17
2.08, 0.17 < x  0.65
0, 0.65 < x  1
Figure 3.2: Probability Density Function for Simulated µ2(x).
µ3(x) = µ4(x) =
8><>:
0, 0  x  0.2
2.22, 0.2 < x  0.65
0, 0.65 < x  1
Figure 3.3: Probability Density Function for Simulated µ3(x), µ4(x).
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µ5(x) = µ6(x) =
8><>:
0, 0  x  0.2
2.35, 0.2 < x  0.63
0, 0.63 < x  1
Figure 3.4: Probability Density Function for Simulated µ5(x), µ6(x).
µ7(x) =
8><>:
0, 0  x  0.2
3.79, 0.2 < x  0.47
0, 0.47 < x  1
Figure 3.5: Probability Density Function for Simulated µ7(x).
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µ8(x) =
8><>:
0, 0  x  0.2
12.07, 0.2 < x  0.29
0, 0.29 < x  1
Figure 3.6: Probability Density Function for Simulated µ8(x).
assumption is consistent with the fundamental assumption that the na¨ıve agent, while
maximizing in every period with respect to her true quasi–hyperbolic utility function,
consistently ignores this fact in forecasting that future–selves with maximize a purely
hyperbolic utility function.
When choosing whether or not to terminate her membership in period–t, the
learning–na¨ıve agent Section 3.3 ignores the option value of maintaining club mem-
bership for utilization in future periods in which the realized benefits to exercising
membership are exceptionally large. Instead, the agent compares her estimate of the
quasi–hyperbolic discount factor that enters into the utility function of future–period
selves to an exogenously given benchmark value  ¯, and terminates her membership
when Eµt [ ˆ] <  ¯. The two benchmarks considered in Subsection 3.3.4 are given by
those  –values at which the sophisticated agent would utilize a commitment mecha-
nism as embodied in membership termination, under an alternating termination equi-
librium and the probabilistically terminating equilibrium, respectively. In this sense,
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the learning–na¨ıve agent recognizes the imprecision in her beliefs and looks to the
behavior of the sophisticated agent to inform her decision to terminate membership,
despite the fact that the sophisticated agent operates in a deterministic environment
completely lacking in the option value considerations inherent to the stochastic en-
vironment of the learning–na¨ıve agent. From a modeling perspective, the motive
to reduce the number of exogenously determined behavioral features is counterbal-
anced by the desire for tractability; incorporating considerations of option value into
the learning–na¨ıve agent’s decision problem significantly complicates the model and
introduces new philosophical tensions between the learning–na¨ıve agent’s apparent
sophistication on some features of her decision problem and lack of sophistication on
others.
As the learning–na¨ıve agent is only able to learn by utilizing stochastic period–
to–period variation in her decision problem, the source of this variation as presented
in the model Subsection 3.3.4 provides a natural candidate for alternative modeling
assumptions. In particular, rather than learning about her true tendency to pro-
crastinate through stochastic shocks to the benefit of exercising, the learning–na¨ıve
agent could alternatively learn in an environment in which the benefits to exercise
are fixed but the costs are stochastic, or an environment in which the cost of termi-
nation varies stochastically period–to–period while the cost and benefit of exercising
membership remain fixed. Holding the timing of observation of the realization fixed,
the models in which the stochastic element enters through the cost or the benefit of
exercising are isomorphic. Since membership termination is assumed to be perma-
nent, a model of behavioral learning similar to that presented in Subsection 3.3.4 in
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which the stochastic element enters through the termination cost would only have
meaningful implications if the agent can observe the realized cost prior to deciding
to terminate; such a model is also isomorphic to the model presented herein.
As presented, the model isolates the behavioral learning dynamics from strategic
experimentation by allowing the learning–na¨ıve agent to view the realized next–period
benefits to exercising before she commits to a particular action in the current period.
By adjusting the timing of this realization, the structure of the model under each of
the stochastic environments described above would di↵er substantially. In particular,
if the realization of the stochastic benefits to exercising are observed by the agent only
after she commits to exercising, the agent’s decision problem becomes more stationary
in the sense that only the expectation Ef [bt] is used to determine the optimal action
in period–t. However, it also becomes a model in which strategic experimentation
plays a role, as learning only occurs following periods in which the agent chose to
exercise; whenever dt 1 = M , such a model would imply that µt = µt 1.
Fine–tuning of the nature of the stochastic element in the model of Subsec-
tion 3.3.4 might allow for more realistic or natural model environments, and should
likely depend on the details of the environment to which the model is being applied.
These modeling choices aside, the departures of the model from those of fully rational
Bayesian agents remain. At the heart of the issue remains the tension between the
realism of a model and its tractability, a conflict fundamental to economic modeling.
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3.4 Conclusion
Building on the work of O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) and Ali (2011), this paper
presents a model of a learning–na¨ıve agent facing an infinite–horizon choice problem
in an stochastic setting, whose equilibrium behavior bridges those of the standard
na¨ıve and sophisticated agents. The self–learning model presented here is motivated
in part by the call of Fudenberg (2006) for more learning–theoretic based justifica-
tions for the assumption of sophistication and in part by the discrepancies between
the reported empirical behavior in DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) and those pre-
dicted by the standard time–inconsistent types. The results of this model, as well as
the philosophical underpinnings of its framework, compliment the pioneering work of
Ali (2011) to adapt the modeling of time–inconsistent agents to a rigorous learning–
theoretic approach. The temptation–prone Planner/Doer agent of Ali (2011) repre-
sents a counterpart and alternative modeling approach to the procrastination–prone
quasi–hyperbolic discounter of the model presented herein.
In each period, the learning–na¨ıve agent implements an action that is optimal
with regard to her beliefs about the value of the quasi–hyperbolic discount factor
that enters into the utility calculations of her future selves and to the realized next–
period benefit to exercising her membership. To achieve a tractable model and isolate
the process of learning from the well–understood dynamics of strategic experimenta-
tion and option value, the agent is assumed to be quasi–Bayesian; when maximizing
her expected utility she fails to take into consideration the additional learning to
which future–period selves will be privilege, as well as the option value of main-
taining membership for exercising in periods with exceptionally high next–period
Chapter 3: Costly Self–Discovery 58
benefits. Through advanced modeling techniques, future models may be able to in-
corporate these features of the decision problem without considerably compromising
the tractability of the learning problem.
As in Ali (2011), the learning–na¨ıve agent becomes fully aware of her tendency to
procrastinate for certain regions of the model’s parameter space; namely, whenever
the benchmark value     ¯, the learning–na¨ıve agent becomes su ciently convinced
of her procrastination problem and terminates her membership in finite time. When
such learning does not occur, the direction of the bias is towards pessimism: if  ¯ <  ,
the learning–na¨ıve agent will sub–optimally terminator her membership with positive
probability. The combined conclusion of these two results is that in this framework,
the learning–na¨ıve agent cannot remain indefinitely optimistic about her procrasti-
nation problem.
The issue of self–learning in time–inconsistent agents remains an area ripe for the-
oretical development. In many modeling contexts, the assumption of sophistication is
practically and conceptually appealing; the further application of learning–theoretic
models to such agents may provide a stronger foundation on which such assump-
tions rest. Moreover, the issue of learning remains of supreme interest in its own
right. Continued theoretical developments on this front have great potential for wel-
fare enhancing policy recommendations as well as for clear and concise theoretical
predictions.
Chapter 4
Networked One–to–One Matching
4.1 Introduction
In the standard one–to–one matching model of Gale and Shapley (1962), agents
are implicitly assumed to have complete knowledge of the identities of the other
agents in the market, their own preferences over these agents, and the preferences of
the other agents.
In this paper, the standard one–to–one two–sided matching model is augmented
by introducing a concept of local stability. Notions of distance are encoded in a
social network, in which directly linked agents are viewed as being “close” to one
another. This network structure allows for the introduction of two new definitions
of stable matchings, depending on the interpretation of the network. Under the first
definition, the network is seen as limiting the set of potential blocking pairs: only
agents who are linked in the network share enough information about one another’s
preferences to block a potential match. Under the second definition, the network is
59
Chapter 4: Networked One–to–One Matching 60
seen as additionally imposing direct restrictions on the pairs of agents who can be
matched: agents who are not located su ciently close enough – that is, who are not
linked – cannot be matched to one another at any stable matching.
Following Roth and Sotomayor (1990), the analogous properties of these two sets of
network–stable matchings are derived for comparison to the standard model. Through
the implementation of an augmented Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (Gale and Shap-
ley, 1962), the existence of both types of network–stable matching is shown for generic
marriage networks. Moreover, nesting relations between the two new network–stable
matching sets and the set of stable matchings on the associated marriage problem
are derived, and examples are provided to illustrate cases in which nesting does not
generally hold. Finally, the marriage network framework is imagined to be preceded
by a network formation game, in which agents simultaneously propose links while
only having access to limited information about the market.
The model presented here di↵ers in many crucial respects from the literature on
strategic network formation. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) model a dynamic setting
in which the network structure evolves as agents reoptimize their sets of connections
to maximize utility arising from communication across the network, and show that
e cient networks need not be stable in such an environment. Using an implementa-
tion approach, Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) show that this tension can be partially
reconciled in certain settings. Bala and Goyal (1999) characterize the architecture of
equilibrium networks in a setting in which agents receive direct benefits from con-
necting to other agents in a network, and receive indirect benefits from neighbors’
neighbors. Analyzing a similar model, Jackson and Rogers (2005) show that the
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equilibrium network structures exhibit a certain “small worlds” property, in which
densely connected groups of individuals are connected to other groups by sparse links.
Bridging the gap between the literatures on network formation games and bargaining
on networks, Bloch and Jackson (2007) consider a model with transferable utility in
which agents propose and maintain links to maximize direct and indirect benefits re-
ceived from their network connections. In contrast to these bodies of work, the model
of marriage networks presented herein presents the network formation game as pre-
ceding a formal matching process, and as such provides microeconomic foundations
for utility derived solely from network connections. Within the marriage networks
framework, indirect benefits to connections are received insofar as they impact the
set of network–stable matchings.
The marriage networks model presented here shares many common properties
with that of Arcaute and Vassilvitskii (2009). Whereas this paper focuses on the
theoretic properties of the sets of network–stable matchings, their work provides a
reinterpretation of the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm of Gale and Shapley (1962) as
a myopic best response dynamic. While providing a similar nesting result on one set
of network–stable matchings and stable matchings to the associated marriage prob-
lem, Arcaute and Vassilvitskii (2009) approach the question from a computational
perspective and show that proving the equality of these two sets is NP–complete.
In Section 4.2, the marriage problem is augmented to include a network structure
and the new stability concepts of interested are introduced. The properties of these
sets are derived and analyzed in Section 4.3, which includes several examples illus-
trating properties of stable matchings that do not translate to network–stable match-
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ings. Following Gale and Shapley (1962), the existence of the relevant network–stable
matchings are established for generic marriage networks, and the opposing interests
of the two sides of the market are established, as in Knuth (1976). In Section 4.4, the
marriage network framework is embedded in a network formation game. The natural
definition of a Nash equilibrium in this network formation and matching game is in-
troduced, and the set of such Nash equililbria is characterized in the full information
setting. The section concludes with a discussion of the modeling issues inherent to
network formation games and the likely intractability of a full characterization of the
set of Nash equilibria in a private information setting.
4.2 Notation & Definitions
Consider two disjoint finite sets of agents, given by M = {m1, . . . ,mM} and
W = {w1, . . . , wW}, which we will refer to as the sets of men and women, respectively.
Let N =M[W be the set of all agents in the market. Each man m 2M is endowed
with a strict preference relation  m, which is a complete asymmetric binary relation
on W [ {m}. Similarly, each woman w 2 W is endowed with a strict preference
relation  w overM[{w}. Woman w is unacceptable to man m if m  m w, and man
m is unacceptable to woman w if w  w m.
Let Pm denote the set of all preference relations for man m and define
PM = ⇥m2MPm, (4.1)
with representative element  M= ( m1 , . . . , mM ). Preference domains for each
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woman and the preference domain for the set of women are defined analogously.
Define P = PM ⇥PW , with representative element, or preference profiles,
 N= ( m1 , . . . , mM , w1 , . . . , wW ). (4.2)
A marriage problem is a triple hM,W , i. Given a marriage problem, a matching
µ is a 1–1 function µ :M [W !M [W satisfying
(i) 8m 2M, 8w 2W , µ(m) = w if and only if µ(w) = m;
(ii) 8m 2M, µ(m) 2W [ {m}, and;
(iii) 8w 2W , µ(w) 2M [ {w}.
The first requirement ensures that man m is matched with woman w if and only if
woman w is matched with manm. The second and third requirements ensure that any
man not matched to a woman is matched to himself (that is, he remains unmatched),
and analogously for each woman.
For each agent i 2 N , let%i be the weak preference relation on the set of matchings
induced by  i. That is, for matchings µ and ⌫, µ %i ⌫ if and only if µ(i) = ⌫(i) or
µ(i)  i ⌫(i).
Given a marriage problem hM,W , i, a matching µ is individually rational if
for all i 2 N , µ(i) %i i; that is, if no agent is matched to an agent he or she finds
unacceptable. For a fixed matching µ, agents (m,w) 2 M ⇥W form a blocking–
pair of µ if w  m µ(m) and m  w µ(w); that is, if agents m and w prefer to be
matched to each other than to their assigned partners under µ. A matching µ is
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stable for hM,W , i if it is individually rational and there exist no blocking–pairs.
Let U(M,W , ) denote the set of stable matchings on hM,W , i.
Having introduced the standard notations and definitions from matching theory,
I next introduce the machinery needed to analyze one–to–one matching with an un-
derlying network structure.
Definition 4.2.1. A marriage network is a 4–tuple hM,W , , i, where   ✓
M⇥W.
Borrowing from the networks literature, the network   is a null network if   = ;
and is biclique if   = M ⇥W . The network   can be viewed as encoding a binary
relation onN that will be useful in defining stable matches on a marriage network. For
the purposes of this section, we assume that the network structure   is exogenously
given. In particular, it is not the result of a strategic network–formation process.
Definition 4.2.2. Man m 2M and woman w 2W are aquatinted in hM,W , , i
if (m,w) 2  .
The acquaintance relation may be modeled as interacting with the set of stable
matchings in two distinct ways: it could shrink the set of stable matchings by restrict-
ing which man–woman pairs are permitted under a matching, or it could expand the
set of stable matchings by restricting which man–woman pairs are permitted to form
blocking pairs. The next two definitions formalize these interpretations.
Definition 4.2.3. Given a marriage network hM,W , , i, a matching µ respects
  if µ(m) = w implies that (m,w) 2  .
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Definition 4.2.4. Given a marriage network hM,W , , i and a matching µ, agents
(m,w) 2M⇥W form a local blocking–pair in   if w  m µ(m), m  w µ(w), and
(m,w) 2  .
With these definitions in mind, two new definitions of stable matchings on mar-
riage networks can be introduced.
Definition 4.2.5. Given a marriage network hM,W , , i, the matching µ is in-
formationally  –stable if µ is individually rational and has no local blocking–pairs.
Given a marriage network hM,W , , i, let U I (M,W , ) denote the set of in-
formationally  –stable matchings. Informationally network–stable matchings are im-
portant in markets in which a centralized matching occurs, as the definition places
no restrictions beyond individual rationality on which pairs of agents can be feasibly
matched, but rather restricts the number of potential blocking pairs. The National
Resident Matching Program (NRMP) represents a market in which informationally
network–stable matchings are a relevant equilibrium concept: if residents and resi-
dency programs are unaware of the preferences of some of the other players in the
market, any matching issued by the NRMP would be stable so long as it were in-
dividually rational and there were no resident–hospital pairs who were informed of
each other’s preferences and formed a local blocking pair. Hence, the market de-
signer is constrained in choosing a matching by the local information available to the
participants, but not by the existence of the network otherwise.
The second definition of stable matchings on marriage networks requires not only
that a matching be individually rational and have no local blocking pairs, but also
that it respect the network structure.
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Definition 4.2.6. Given a marriage network hM,W , , i, the matching µ is tech-
nologically  –stable if µ respects  , is individually rational, and has no local
blocking–pairs.
Let U T (M,W , ) denote the set of technologically  –stable matchings for a mar-
riage network hM,W , , i. In contrast to informationally network–stable match-
ings, technologically network–stable matchings are important in large markets in
which matchings form without the aid of centralization. In such markets, agents
can only form potential matchings with agents with whom they are acquainted. Con-
sider, for example, the market for romantic partners in New York City. It is obvious
that players are only informed of the existence of a small subset of the other players
in the market, and of the preferences of an even smaller subset. Matchings can only
occur between agents who know each other, and who prefer each other to any other
agent with whom they are acquainted. Allowing the network structure to encode the
set of potential partners with whom an agent is capable of matching, the network can
be understood as representing a technological constraint. Examples of such techno-
logical constraints may include geographical distance, language barriers, or legislative
restrictions on marriageable partners.
Given a marriage problem hM,W , i, agent j is achievable to agent i if there
exists a stable matching µ under which µ(i) = j. Similar definitions exist for the
network stable matching concepts introduced above, and will be useful in analyzing
the structure of the sets U I (M,W , ) and U T (M,W , ).
Definition 4.2.7. Given a marriage network hM,W , , i, agent j is informa-
tionally achievable to agent i if 9µ 2 U I (M,W , ) such that µ(i) = j.
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Definition 4.2.8. Given a marriage network hM,W , , i, agent j is technologi-
cally achievable to agent i if 9µ 2 U T (M,W , ) such that µ(i) = j.
For notational convenience, let A(i;M,W , ) denote the set of agents who are
achievable to agent i in the marriage problem hM,W , i, and letA I (i;M,W , ) and
A T (i;M,W , ) denote the sets of agents who are, respectively, informationally and
technologically achievable to agent i in the marriage network hM,W , , i. These
sets produce a natural relation on the set of agents N , as the next lemma states.
Lemma 4.2.9. Achievability induces a symmetric relation on M ⇥W; that is, j 2
A k (i;M,W , ) if and only if i 2 A k (j;M,W , ), for k 2 {I, T}.
The result follows directly from the definition of a network–stable matching: if
there exists µ 2 U k (M,W , ) such that µ(i) = j, then necessarily µ(j) = i, for
k 2 {I, T}. In Section 4.3, Corollary 4.3.2 will show that these sets have a natural
nesting for any marriage network.
4.3 Properties of Network Stable Matchings
In this section, the properties and structure of informationally and technologically
stable network matchings are considered. Whenever possible, results on marriage
networks are compared and contrasted to well–established results on the analogous
marriage problems.
The following lemma establishes a natural nesting of the sets of informationally
and technologically network–stable matchings.
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Lemma 4.3.1. For any marriage network hM,W , , i, the set of technologically
 –stable matchings is contained within the set of informationally  –stable matching;
that is, U T (M,W , ) ✓ U I (M,W , ).
The proof follows from the definitions of informationally and technologically network–
stable matchings. If µ 2 U T (M,W , ), then by definition µ is individually rational
and has no local blocking pairs. Hence, µ 2 U I (M,W , ). Intuitively, technolog-
ically network–stable matchings are subject to the same blocking–pair constraints
as informationally network–stable matchings, and are further subject to additional
constraints concerning the set of feasible (that is,   respecting) matches.
Corollary 4.3.2. For any marriage network hM,W , , i and any agent i 2 N , if
agent j is technologically achievable to agent i, she is also informationally achievable
to agent i; that is, A T (i;M,W , ) ✓ A I (i;M,W , ).
The result follows from Lemmas 4.3.1: if there exists
µ 2 U T (M,W , ) ✓ U I (M,W , ) (4.3)
such that µ(i) = j, then j 2 A T (i;M,W , ) and j 2 A I (i;M,W , ).
The next lemma establishes a natural nesting of the set of stable matchings on the
marriage problem hM,W , i and the set of informationally network–stable matchings
on the associated marriage network hM,W , , i.
Lemma 4.3.3. For any marriage network hM,W , , i, the set of stable matchings
on hM,W , i is contained within the set of informationally  –stable matchings on
hM,W , , i; that is, U(M,W , ) ✓ U I (M,W , ).
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The proof follows from the definitions of stable matchings and informationally
network–stable matchings. If µ 2 U(M,W , ), then by definition µ is individually
rational and has no blocking pairs; in particular, this implies that µ has no local
blocking pairs. Hence, µ 2 U I (M,W , ). Intuitively, informationally network–
stable matchings face fewer constraints in terms of potential blocking pairs than
stable matchings.
Lemmas 4.3.1 and 4.3.3 provide weak nesting conditions; Lemma 4.3.4 gives con-
ditions under which the sets of matchings under consideration coincide.
Lemma 4.3.4. For any set of men M and any set of women W, if network   ✓
M ⇥W is biclique, then for all preference profiles  2 P, the sets of stable match-
ings, informationally network–stable matchings, and technologically network–stable
matching coincide; that is, U(M,W , ) = U T (M,W , ) = U I (M,W , ).
The proof is straightforward, but is provided in Appendix C.1 for completeness.
In a biclique network the definitions of blocking–pairs and local blocking–pairs are
equivalent, and all matchings trivially respect the network. Hence, the matching
concepts trivially coincide under a biclique network.
The definition of technologically stable network matchings is more restrictive than
the definition of stable matchings, in that weakly fewer matchings are considered fea-
sible; however, it is less restrictive in that the set of potential blocking–pairs is weakly
smaller. These forces suggest that the sets of stable matchings and technologically
network–stable matchings cannot be generically nested; Proposition 4.3.5 confirms
this intuition.
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Proposition 4.3.5. For any set of menM, any set of womenW, and any preference
profile  2 P such that there exist m 2M and w 2 W with w  m m and m  w w,
there exists a network   ✓ M ⇥W such that U(M,W , ) 6✓ U T (M,W , ) and
U T (M,W , ) 6✓ U(M,W , ).
The proof is available in Appendix C.2. The restriction on the preferences is both
necessary and su cient for the result to hold; if all men find all women unacceptable
at   or all women find all men unacceptable  , then the only matching that is stable
on either the marriage problem or any associated marriage network is that in which
each player is unmatched. The following example illustrates the construction of such
a network, given a suitable preference profile.
Example 4.3.6. Let N = {m1,m2}, W = {w1, w2}, and let preferences   be given
by
 =
8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
m1 : w1   w2   m1
m2 : w1   w2   m2
w1 : m1   m2   w1
w2 : m2   m1   w2.
(4.4)
In particular, every man finds every woman acceptable, and every woman finds every
man acceptable. Consider the network given by   = {(m1, w2), (m2, w1), (m2, w2)},
depicted in Figure 4.1.
Consider the matching µ = {(m1, w2), (m2, w1)}, and note that µ respects  , is
individually rational, and has no local blocking pairs. Hence, µ 2 U T (M,W , ).
However, µ 62 U(M,W , ), since (m1, w1) forms a blocking pair for µ in the marriage
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m1
m2
w1
w2
Figure 4.1: Network  , from Example 4.3.6.
problem hM,W , i.
Similarly, consider the matching ⌫ = {(m1, w1), (m2, w2)}, and note that ⌫ is
individually rational and has no blocking pairs. Hence, ⌫ 2 U(M,W , ). However,
⌫ 62 U T (M,W , ) since it does not respect  . In particular, (m1, w1) 62  .
Therefore,   constitutes a network for which U(M,W , ) 6✓ U T (M,W , ) and
U T (M,W , ) 6✓ U(M,W , )
Proposition 4.3.5 shows that the sets U(M,W , ) and U T (M,W , ) cannot be
nested in a way that is robust to all networks   for a suitable fixed preference profile
 . Conversely, Proposition 4.3.7 shows that the sets cannot be nested in a way that
is robust to all preference profiles   for a suitable fixed network structure  .
Proposition 4.3.7. For any set of men M, any set of women W, and any network
structure   ✓M⇥W that is not biclique, there exists a preference profile  2 P such
that U(M,W , ) 6✓ U T (M,W , ) and U T (M,W , ) 6✓ U(M,W , ).
The proof is available in Appendix C.3, and proceeds by constructing a prefer-
ence profile as a function of the given network   that yields the desired result. It
should be noted that there may exist other preference profiles that lead to the same
conclusion; in particular, Example 4.3.6 could be reinterpreted as a demonstration of
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the construction of a preference profile, distinct from that specified in Appendix C.3,
under which the sets U(M,W , ) and U T (M,W , ) cannot be nested.
Lemma 4.3.4 and Propositions 4.3.5 and 4.3.7 are captured in Figure 4.2, where
the size of the intersection of the set of stable matchings and the set of technologi-
cally network–stable matchings depends on the specific network and preference profile
under consideration.
Stable
Matchings
Technologically
 –Stable
Matchings
Informationally  –Stable Matchings
Figure 4.2: Generic Nesting Relationships of Stable Matching Concepts
Having analyzed the relationships between the various sets of stable matchings,
Theorem 4.3.9 and its corollary establish the existence of informationally and tech-
nologically network–stable matchings.
Theorem 4.3.8. A technologically  –stable matching exists for every marriage net-
work hM,W , , i; that is, U T (M,W , ) 6= ; for all hM,W , , i.
The proof is available in Appendix C.4, in which a modified version of the Gale–
Shapley Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (1962) is used to explicitly construct a tech-
nologically  –stable matching. Intuitively, if (m,w) 62  , the modified algorithm
treats man m as if he were unacceptable to woman w, and woman w as if she was
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unacceptable to man m. See Appendix C.4 for a formal definition of the Network–
Respecting Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (NDAA) and proof that for any marriage
network hM,W , , i, it is well–defined, terminates in finite time, and always pro-
duces a technologically  –stable matching.
Theorem 4.3.8 and Lemma 4.3.1 yield the following corollary, which can also be
derived from Lemma 4.3.3 in the context of Gale & Shapley (1962).
Corollary 4.3.9. An informationally  –stable matching exists for every marriage
network hM,W , , i; that is, U I (M,W , ) 6= ; for all hM,W , , i.
Having established that informationally and technologically network–stable match-
ings exist, the next proposition justifies consideration of them from the perspective of
Parteo optimality. Given a marriage problem hM,W , i, the set of stable matchings
is Pareto undominated in the set of matchings. The proof is by contradiction: sup-
pose that stable matching µ is Pareto dominated by matching ⌫, so that by definition
⌫ %i µ for all i 2 N and there exists j 2 N for whom ⌫  j µ. Note in particular that
this implies that ⌫(j) 6= µ(j) and hence µ(⌫(j)) 6= j. Since ⌫ %⌫(j) µ, it therefore
follows that j  ⌫(j) µ(⌫(j)), so that the matching µ is blocked by (j, ⌫(j)), a contra-
diction. An analogous result holds for the set of technologically  –stable matchings
on the marriage network hM,W , , i.
Proposition 4.3.10. For any marriage network hM,W , , i, the set of techno-
logically  –stable matchings is Pareto dominant in the set of matchings that respect
 .
The proof is available in Appendix C.5. An analogous result does not hold for the
set of informationally network–stable matchings, as the next proposition posits.
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Proposition 4.3.11. For any set of men M, any set of women W, and any pref-
erence profile  2 P such that there exist m 2 M and w 2 W with w  m m and
m  w w, there exists   ✓ M ⇥ W such that the set of informationally  –stable
matchings contains matchings that are Pareto dominated within U I (M,W , ).
The proof is available in Appendix C.6, and proceeds by constructing a network  
on which there is a Pareto dominated informationally  –stable matching. The result
is not surprising: since players must be acquainted in order to form a local–blocking
pair, it is easy to construct networks in which two unacquainted players could be
made strictly better o↵ by being matched to each other without detriment to the
other players.
As in Proposition 4.3.5, the restriction on preferences in Proposition 4.3.11 is
necessary for the construction to yield the negative result; if all men find all women
unacceptable at   or all women find all men unacceptable  , then the only matching
that is informationally network–stable is that in which each player is unmatched.
Under such preferences, this null matching is uniquely Pareto optimal in the set of
all matchings.
It is an interesting and open question as to whether there exist general joint
conditions on the preference profile   and the network   that ensure that the set
of informationally network–stable matchings on marriage network hM,W , , i is
Pareto undominated. For the special case of a biclique network, Lemma 4.3.4 and
Proposition 4.3.10 yield the following result.
Corollary 4.3.12. For any set of men M and any set of women W, if network
  ✓M⇥W is biclique, then the set of informationally  –stable matchings is Pareto
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dominant in the set of matchings.
In addition to Pareto optimality, there are two analogous optimality conditions
that can be naturally applied to marriage networks. The introduction of these con-
ditions requires two new definitions.
Definition 4.3.13. Given a marriage network hM,W , , i, a technologically network–
stable matching µ 2 U T (M,W , ) is MT–optimal if µ %m ⌫ for all m 2 M and
all ⌫ 2 U T (M,W , ). Similarly, a technologically network–stable matching µ 2
U T (M,W , ) is WT–optimal if µ %w ⌫ for all w 2W and all ⌫ 2 U T (M,W , ).
Definition 4.3.14. Given a marriage network hM,W , , i, an informationally
network–stable matching µ 2 U I (M,W , ) is MI–optimal if µ %m ⌫ for all
m 2 M and all ⌫ 2 U I (M,W , ). Similarly, an informationally network–stable
matching µ 2 U I (M,W , ) is WI–optimal if µ %w ⌫ for all w 2 W and all
⌫ 2 U I (M,W , ).
The following theorem states that MT–optimal and WT–optimal technologically
network–stable matchings exists for every marriage network hM,W , , i, and pro-
vides an algorithm for computing them.
Theorem 4.3.15. When all men and all women have strict preferences, there exists a
MT–optimal technologically  –stable matching and a WT–optimal technologically  –
stable matching for every marriage network   ✓M⇥W. Furthermore, the matching
µMT produced by the men–proposing network–respecting deferred acceptance algorithm
is the unique MT–optimal technologically  –stable matching. Similarly, the unique
WT–optimal technologically  –stable matching is produced by the women–proposing
network–respecting deferred acceptance algorithm.
Chapter 4: Networked One–to–One Matching 76
The proof is available in Appendix C.7, and is parallel to that in Gale & Shap-
ley (1962). On the set of informationally network–stable matchings, optimal stable
matchings need not exist, as the following theorem states.
Theorem 4.3.16. There exist marriage networks hM,W , , i for which no MI–
optimal or WI–optimal informationally  –stable matchings exist.
Example 4.3.17 illustrates the result of Theorem 4.3.16. It is an open question
as to whether there exist conditions on marriage networks hM,W , , i under which
the existence of MI–optimal and WI–optimal informationally  –stable matchings is
guaranteed.
Example 4.3.17. Let N = {m1,m2}, W = {w1, w2}, and   be given by
 =
8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
m1 : w1   w2   m1
m2 : w1   w2   m2
w1 : m1   m2   w1
w2 : m1   m2   w2.
(4.5)
Let the network structure be given by   = {(m1, w2), (m2, w1), (m2, w2)}, as depicted
in Figure 4.3.
It can be shown that
U I (M,W , ) =
8><>:
µ = {(m1, w1), (m2, w2)}
⌫ = {(m1, w2), (m2, w1)}
9>=>; . (4.6)
Moreover, µ  m1 ⌫ but ⌫  m2 µ, and µ  w1 ⌫ but ⌫  w2 µ. Hence, no MI–optimal
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m1
m2
w1
w2
.
Figure 4.3: Network  , from Example 4.3.17
nor WI–optimal informationally  –stable matching exists for the given marriage net-
work.
Extending our notation, for any two matchings µ and ⌫, let µ %M ⌫ denote that
µ %m ⌫ for all m 2M; let µ %W ⌫ be defined analogously.
Theorem 4.3.18. Given a marriage network hM,W , , i, the common preferences
of the two sides of the markets are opposed on the set of technologically  –stable
matchings. That is, if µ, ⌫ 2 U T (M,W , , ), then µ %M ⌫ if and only if ⌫ %W µ.
The proof is availble in Appendix C.8, and is parallel to that in Knuth (1976).
The following corollary is immediate from Theorems 4.3.8 and 4.3.18.
Corollary 4.3.19. Given a marriage network hM,W , , i, the MT–optimal tech-
nologically  –stable matching is the worst technologically stable matching for the
women. Similarly, the WT–optimal technologically  –stable matching matches each
man with his least preferred achievable mate.
Given two matchings µ and ⌫, define the “meet” of µ and ⌫ as
(µ ^ ⌫)(i) =
8>>><>>>:
min
 i
{µ(i), ⌫(i)}, if i 2M
max
 i
{µ(i), ⌫(i)}, if i 2W .
(4.7)
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That is, the meet of matchings µ and ⌫ assigns to each man his least–preferred mate
and to each woman her most–preferred mate from the two matchings. Similarly, we
can define the “join” of µ and ⌫ as
(µ _ ⌫)(i) =
8>>><>>>:
max
 i
{µ(i), ⌫(i)}, if i 2M
min
 i
{µ(i), ⌫(i)}, if i 2W ,
(4.8)
which assigns to each man his most–preferred mate and to each woman her least–
preferred mate from the two matchings.
Conway shows that the set of stable matches on the marriage problem hM,W , i
has a lattice structure. That is, if µ and ⌫ are stable matchings, the resulting objects
(µ ^ ⌫) and (µ _ ⌫) are also stable matchings. This result survives translation to the
set of technologically network–stable matchings.
Theorem 4.3.20. Given a marriage network hM,W , , i, if µ, ⌫ 2 U T (M,W , ),
then (µ _ ⌫), (µ ^ ⌫) 2 U T (M,W , ).
The proof is available in Appendix C.9. As the next example shows, the set of
informationally network–stable matchings need not have a lattice structure.
Example 4.3.21. Let N = {m1,m2}, W = {w1, w2}, and   be given by
 =
8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
m1 : w1   w2   m1
m2 : w1   w2   m2
w1 : m1   m2   w1
w2 : m1   m2   w2.
(4.9)
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Let the network structure be given by   = {(m1, w2), (m2, w1), (m2, w2)}, as depicted
in Figure 4.4.
m1
m2
w1
w2
.
Figure 4.4: Network  , from Example 4.3.21
It can be easily verified that
µ = {(m1, w1), (m2, w2)} 2 U I (M,W , ) (4.10)
and
⌫ = {(m1, w2), (m2, w1)} 2 U I (M,W , ). (4.11)
However, the meet and join given by
(µ ^ ⌫) = {(m1, w2), (m2, w2), (m1, w1), (m2, w2)} (4.12)
and
(µ _ ⌫) = {(m1, w1), (m2, w1), (m2, w1), (m1, w2)} (4.13)
are not well–defined matchings and hence are not informationally network–stable
matchings.
While Example 4.3.21 illustrates a particular marriage network in which the set
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of informally network–stable matchings does not have lattice structure, it remains an
open question whether there exist necessary and su cient conditions on a marriage
network under which the set of informally network–stable matchings does not have a
lattice structure.
4.4 Strategic Network Formation
Having established the framework for analyzing networked marriage problems on
fixed exogenously given networks, it is natural to embed such a model into a network
formation game. This translation requires the construction of additional machinery
and the donning of assumptions not typically made within the matching literature.
To adapt the marriage network framework to a game theoretic model, agents’
ordinal utility must be translated to cardinal utility. For each man m 2M, let um(·)
be a utility function on W representing  m; similarly, define uw(·) for each woman.
The appropriate functional forms of these utility functions remains an open modeling
question, and will likely depend heavily on the context in which the model is being
applied.
Each man m 2 M is endowed with a pure strategy space Sm = {0, 1}W with
representative element sm(w) 2 Sm, where sm(w) = 1 if man m proposes a link to
woman w. Each woman has an analogous pure strategy space, and each agent has
a mixed strategy space given by the unit simplex  (Si) on Si with representative
element  i.
The network–formation technology and cost structure requires a number of ad-
ditional modeling assumptions. In particular, what is required for a link to form
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between man m and woman w? What is the cost of proposing a link, and is there
an additional cost to link formation? For the purposes of this exercise, the network–
formation technology is assumed to correspond to an “and” network: (m,w) 2  
if and only if sm(w) = 1 and sw(m) = 1. When players employ mixed strategies,
the resulting network will depend on the specific realization of link proposals. Link
formation is assumed to be costly, with each member of a link (m,w) 2   incurring
a cost c when the link is formed. To reduce the multiplicity of equilibria, link propo-
sition is also assumed to costly, with each unrealized but proposed link costing the
proposing agent ✏. Under this modeling framework, when the pure strategy profile s
is played, agent i pays a link formation cost of
ci(s) =
X
j2N\{i}
I[si(j)=1]
 
✏+ (c  ✏)I[(i,j)2 ]
 
. (4.14)
In the complete information setting, the network formation game proceeds as
follows.
t = 0: A preference profile   is realized and is common knowledge.
t = 1: Players simultaneously announce strategies  i.
t = 2: Network   is randomly drawn from the distribution on bipartite graphs
produced by  .
t = 3: A network–stable matching µ is chosen.
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t = 4: Each player i 2 N realizes utility given by
ui(µ(i)) 
X
(i,j)2 
c 
X
(i,j) 62 
✏ i(j). (4.15)
It remains an important modeling question how the network–stable matching should
be selected when the sets U I (M,W , ) and U T (M,W , ) are not singleton.
In this framework, the natural definition of a Nash equilibrium is given as follows.
Definition 4.4.1. A mixed–strategy profile   is a pairwise–Nash equilibrium if
for all pairs (m,w) 2M⇥W and all mixed strategies  ˜m,  ˜w,
E[um(  (m,w),  ˜m,  ˜w)] < E[um( )]. (4.16)
Note that in Definition 4.4.1, the expectation operator is taken both with respect
to the distribution on bipartite networks produced by the mixed strategy profiles as
well as the distribution over network–stable matchings determined by the mechanism.
If it is assumed that a network–stable matching is selected uniformly at random from
U T (M,W , ), the following result obtains in the complete information case.
Theorem 4.4.2. Consider a marriage network formation game hM,W , {ui}i2N i in
which preferences are common knowledge. Suppose that there is a link–proposal cost
of ✏ > 0 and a link–formation cost of c. If ✏ < c and
c < min
(i,j) s.t. 9µ2U(M,W, ) s.t. µ(i)=j
{ui(j)  ui(i)},
then the pure–strategy profile s? is a pairwise–Nash equilibrium if and only if there
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exists a technologically  a–stable matching µ on the marriage problem hM,W , i
such that
s?i (j) =
8>>><>>>:
1, if µ(i) = j
0, otherwise.
(4.17)
The proof of Theorem 4.4.2 is available in Appendix C.10, and appeals to the
following lemma.
Lemma 4.4.3. Consider a marriage network formation game hM,W , {ui}i2N i. Sup-
pose that there is a link–proposal cost of ✏ > 0 and a link–formation cost of c. If s?
is a pure–strategy pairwise–Nash equilibrium, then U (s
?)
T is a singleton. Moreover,
s?i (j) = 1 if and only if µ(i) = j, where U
 (s?)
T = {µ}.
The proof of Lemma 4.4.3 is available in Appendix C.11. Theorem 4.4.2 should
be understood as a formal confirmation that embedding the marriage problem with
a network structure does not fundamentally alter the model under full information
assumptions; that is, network–respecting stability concepts have no bite in a full
information setting. The true test of the theory of marriage networks lies in the
equilibrium predictions of network formation models in which preferences are private
information. These predictions remain an open question, and solving for the set
of pairwise–Nash equilibria in models in which preferences are privately known and
uncorrelated presently appears intractable.
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4.5 Conclusion
In large markets, the implicit assumption of common knowledge of preferences in-
herent to the matching literature may lead to predictions that di↵er substantially from
observed market outcomes. By embedding the standard matching framework into a
social network, the informational limitations of the agents can be explicitly captured
in a structure amenable to economic and mathematical analysis. The framework and
results presented here set the stage for future researchers. In particular, the ques-
tion of characterizing the set of pairwise–Nash equilibria under informational settings
other than common knowledge of preferences remains incredibly important and open.
This paper presents a particular model of networked one–to–one matching, and es-
tablishes a number of properties of such markets analogous to those presented in Roth
and Sotomayor (1962) on the standard marriage problem. Where analogous results
cannot be obtained, a number of examples are presented illustrating the mechanism
through which certain properties fail to hold. Finally, a bare–bones network forma-
tion game is considered and it is shown that under full information, embedding a
marriage problem with a network structure does not meaningfully alter the set of
equilibrium predictions.
The true test of the marriage network framework lies in equilibrium predictions
for network formation games that precede a networked matching procedure. Theo-
rem 4.4.2 characterizes the set of pure–strategy pairwise–Nash equilibria under full
information, and verifies that the additional machinery of the marriage network frame-
work has no e↵ect on the set of equilibria in the absence of informational restrictions.
It remains to determine what equilibrium characterizations are possible under more
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restrictive assumptions on agents’ information sets. As is endemic within the litera-
ture on social networks, model tractability and the absence of closed–form analytic
solutions remain the most considerable barriers to further characterization results.
Barring technical or mathematical innovations that expand the scope of analytically
tractable network questions, employing alternative modeling assumptions may allow
for incremental progress. The network formation technology – that is, under what
link proposal conditions network links are formed – and the cost structure of link
proposal and formation present themselves as the modeling assumptions most ripe
for reconsideration.
While not considered in this paper, adapting the model to allow for informational
exchange between agents who are not directly connected in a network would expand
the scope of the model and align it more closely with the social networks literature.
Following Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), Dutta and Mutuswami (1997), Bala and
Goyal (1999), and Jackson and Rogers (2005), a candidate model of this type would
allow for agent i to learn about the existence and preferences of agent j with a
probability that decreases exponentially in the length of the shortest path connecting
i to j in  . It is worth noting that the incentives for link formation would di↵er
markedly in such a model from those in the model presented here; in particular, in a
model in which agents can learn about the existence and preferences of agents with
whom they are only indirectly connected, agents have an incentive to form within–
group links in addition to between–group links.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Supplemental Notation & Definitions
The following two definitions are used throughout Appendix A in proving the
results of Chapter 2.
Given a preference profile p and alternatives x, y 2 X, letNp(x, y) = {i 2 N : x  pi
y} denote the coalition over (x, y), and note that for all p, x, and y: (i) Np(x, y) ✓ N ;
(ii) #Np(x, y) 2 N+; (iii) Np(x, y)\Np(y, x) = ;, and; (iv) Np(x, y)[Np(y, x) = N . A
coalition is a majority coalition for x over y if #Np(x, y) >
n
2 . Having introduced the
notion of majority coalitions, note that equivalent definition of a strong Condorcet
winner: alternative x 2 X is the strong Condorcet winner at profile p 2 A(X)n if and
only if #Np(x, y) >
n
2 for all y 2 X \ {x}.
Given profiles p, q 2 }, the standard sequence from p to q is the set {qt}nt=0, where
q0 = p and for t > 0, qt(i) = q(i) for all i 2 {1, . . . , t} and qt(i) = p(i) for all
i 2 {t + 1, . . . , n}. The standard sequence {qt}nt=0 can be thought of as a “path”
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consisting of n+1 profiles that starts at p and ends at q. It should be noted that for
an arbitrary domain }, p, q 2 } does not imply that {qt}nt=0 ⇢ }.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2.4.1
Proof. Let p 2 }C , so that by definition there exists a strong Condorcet winner x 2 X
at preference profile p. Therefore, p 2 Cx ⇢ [x2XCx and hence }C ✓ [x2XCx.
Next, let p 2 [x2XCx. Then there exists x 2 X such that p 2 Cx, so that
by construction x is a strong Condorcet winner at profile p. Therefore p 2 }C by
definition, and hence [x2XCx ✓ }C . Therefore, }C = [x2XCx.
Finally, suppose that p 2 Cx for some x 2 X. Then by construction x is a strong
Condorcet winner at profile p, so that for all y 2 X \ {x}, #Np(x, y) > n2 implies
that #Np(y, x) <
n
2 , since the individual preference orderings in p are asymmetric.
Therefore, y cannot be a strong Condorcet winner at p and hence p 62 Cy for all
y 2 X \ {x}. That is, Cx \ Cy = ; for all x, y 2 X.
The final step in the proof illustrates that if a strong Condorcet winner exists
at profile p, it must be unique. This fact was observed in Section 2.2, but is made
rigorous by appealing to the majority coalitions.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2.4.2
Proof. By definition, x 2 X is the strong Condorcet winner at profile p 2 Cx, so that
for all y 2 X \ {x}, #Np(x, y) > n2 . Since n is even and #Np(x, y) 2 N+ all x, y 2 X,
the strict inequality can be expressed as the weak inequality #Np(x, y)   n2 + 1.
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For i 2 N , let q 2 }C be such that q(j) = p(j) for all j 2 N \ {i}, and choose an
arbitrary y 2 X \ {x}.
If x  qi y, then #Nq(x, y)   #Np(x, y) > n2 , so that x 2 X must be the strong
Condorcet winner at profile q. If y  qi x, then #Nq(x, y)   #Np(x, y)   1   n2 . If
either inequality is strict, then x 2 X must be the strong Condorcet winner at profile
q as above.
If both inequalities bind, then #Nq(x, y) =
n
2 , so that neither alternatives x, y 2 X
can be the strong Condorcet winner at q. Since y 2 X \ {x} was chosen arbitrarily,
this implies that there does not exist a Condorcet winner at profile q, so that q 62 }C ,
a contradiction.
Therefore, alternative x is the strong Condorcet winner at q, so that q 2 Cx.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 2.4.3
Proof. The proof of necessity is straightforward: if g is strategy–proof over the entire
domain }C it must also be strategy–proof over any subdomain. In particular, it must
be strategy–proof over each Condorcet section Cx ⇢ }C for all x 2 X.
To prove su ciency, suppose that the restriction g|Cx is strategy–proof for each
x 2 X but that g is not strategy–proof on }C . Then there exist profiles p, q 2 }C
and an individual i 2 N such that p(j) = q(j) for all j 2 N \ {i} and g(q)  ip g(p).
Since the set of Condorcet sections produces a partition of }C by Lemma 2.4.1,
there exists x 2 X such that p 2 Cx. Moreover, q 2 Cx by Lemma 2.4.2. Then
individual i can manipulate g|Cx at profile p via q(i), a contradiction. Therefore, if
g|Cx is strategy–proof for each x 2 X, then g is strategy–proof on }C .
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A.5 Proof of Proposition 2.4.5
Proof. The proof is immediate: if #g(Cx) = 1, then for all i 2 N , p 2 Cx, and q 2 Cx
such that q(j) = p(j) for all j 2 N \ {i}, g|Cx(p) = g|Cx(q). Hence, no individual can
manipulate and g|Cx is strategy–proof.
Intuitively, since the restriction g|Cx is not responsive to preferences, no individual
can manipulate g|Cx over its domain Cx. Note that this result is independent of
whether g satisfies unanimity, in which case g(Cx) = {x} necessarily. Note further
that majority rule is such that #g(Cx) = 1 for all x 2 X, with g(Cx) = {x}, and is
therefore strategy–proof on }C .
A.6 Proof of Proposition 2.4.6
Proof. Let x 2 X be such that #g(Cx) = 2, and let g(Cx) = {y, z} ⇢ X (where
possibly z = z or y = x, but not both).
To show necessity, suppose that g|Cx does not satisfy non–reversal. Then there
exist profiles p, q 2 Cx such that g|Cx(p) = z and g|Cx(q) = y, and some i 2 N
such that y  pi z, and q(j) = p(j) for all j 2 N \ {i}. Therefore, individual i could
manipulate g|Cx at profile p via q(i), so that g|Cx is not strategy–proof.
To show su ciency, suppose that g|Cx satisfies non–reversal. For p 2 Cx, if
g|Cx(p) = z and z  pi y for some i 2 N , then individual i cannot precipitate the
selection of a more preferred alternative by reporting a preference ordering other
than p(i), since g(Cx) = {y, z}. If g|Cx(p) = z and y  pi z for some i 2 N , then by
the non–reversal condition individual i cannot precipitate the selection of y. Thus,
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g|Cx is strategy–proof.
Note that this result is independent of whether g satisfies unanimity, in which
case x 2 g(Cx) necessarily. Furthermore, this result applies on more general domains:
non–reversal is equivalent to strategy–proofness over any domain with a two–element
range.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 2.4.7
Proof. Su ciency is clear, since dictatorial rule is strategy–proof.
The proof of necessity consists of two cases: when x 2 g(Cx) and when x 62 g(Cx).
When x 2 g(Cx), the structure and content of the proof is similar to that of Campbell
and Kelly (2003), but di↵ers nontrivially at several crucial steps as a result of the
structure of }C when n is even.
When x 62 g(Cx), the proof consists of two steps. In the first step the Gibbard–
Satterthwaite theorem (1973, 1975) is invoked over a subset Ux ⇢ Cx to show that
if g|Cx is strategy–proof on Ux, it must be dictatorial on Ux with respect to the
alternatives in g(Cx). In the second step, strategy–proofness is shown to imply that
the dictator over Ux must be the dictator over the entirety of Cx.
Part 1. Suppose that g|Cx is strategy–proof, with #g(Cx)   3 and x 2 g(Cx).
Step 1.1: If x 2 g(Cx), then g|Cx(u) = x at every unanimous profile u 2 Cx.
Let p 2 Cx be such that g|Cx(p) = x, and let u 2 Cx be a unanimous profile at
which u1(i) = x for all i 2 N . Let {ut}nt=1 be the standard sequence from profile p to
u. Note that for all t 2 {0, . . . , n}, #Nut(x, y)   #Np(x, y) > n2 , since p 2 Cx and
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at each element ut in the standard sequence, alternative x is promoted to maximal
element of individual i’s preference ordering. Therefore, {ut}nt=1 ⇢ Cx.
By assumption, g|Cx(p) ⌘ g|Cx(u0) = x. For t 2 {0, . . . , n}, suppose that
g|Cx(ut) = x but g|Cx(ut+1) = y for some y 2 g(Cx) \ {x}. Since ut+11 (t + 1) = x,
x  ut+1t+1 y so that individual t + 1 can manipulate g|Cx at ut+1 via ut(t + 1), a con-
tradiction. Therefore, it must be that g|Cx(ut+1) = x. Continuing the inductive
argument, g|Cx(u) ⌘ g|Cx(un) = x, so that x 2 g(Cx) implies that g|Cx(u) = x at
every unanimous profile u 2 Cx.
Step 1.2: If g|Cx is non–dictatorial, then g|Cx(p) = x for all profiles p 2 Cx for
which #{i 2 N : p1(i) = x} > n2 .
Define Kx(p) = {i 2 N : p1(i) = x} as the set of individuals for whom x 2 X is
maximal at profile p. From Step 1.1, note that g|Cx(p) = x whenever #Kx(p) = n.
For  2 {n2 +2, . . . , n}, suppose that g|Cx(p) = x whenever #Kx(p) =  and consider
a profile p 2 Cx at which #Kx(p) =   1.
Suppose that g|Cx(p) = y for some y 2 g(Cx) \ {x}. If x  pi y for some i 2
N \Kx(p), then the induction hypothesis implies that individual i could manipulate
g|Cx at profile p via a preference ordering q(i) for which q1(i) = x, a contradiction.
Therefore, y  pi x for all i 2 N \Kx(p).
Let profile q be such that q(i) = p(i) for all i 2 Kx(p) and q(i) = (y   x   . . . )
for all i 2 N \Kx(p). Since #Kx(q) = #Kx(p) > n2 , #Nq(x, z)   #Kx(q) > n2 for all
z 2 g(Cx) \ {x}, so that q 2 Cx. Let {qt}nt=0 be the standard sequence from p to q,
and note that for all z 2 g(Cx) \ {x}, #Nqt(x, z)   #Kx(qt) = #Kx(q) > n2 , so that
{qt}nt=0 ⇢ Cx.
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By assumption, g|Cx(q0) ⌘ g|Cx(p) = y. For t 2 {0, . . . , n}, if g|Cx(qt) = y
and g|Cx(qt+1) 6= y, then necessarily qt+1 6= qt, which implies that t+ 1 2 N \Kx(p),
y  qt+1 g|Cx(qt+1), and hence t+1 can manipulate g|Cx at qt+1 via qt(t+1). Therefore,
g|Cx(qt) = y implies that g|Cx(qt+1) = y, so that g|Cx(q) ⌘ g|Cx(qn) = y by induction.
Let profile r be such that for all i 2 Kx(p), r1(i) = x and z  ri y for all z 2 g(Cx)\
{y}, and r(i) = q(i) for i 2 N \Kx(p). Since #Nr(x, z)   #Kx(r) = #Kx(q) > n2 for
all z 2 g(Cx) \ {x}, r 2 Cx. Let {rt}nt=0 be the standard sequence from profile q to
r, and note that #Nrt(x, z)   #Kx(rt) = #Kx(r) > n2 , so that {rt}nt=0 ⇢ Cx. From
above, g|Cx(r0) ⌘ g|Cx(q) = y.
For t 2 {0, . . . , n}, suppose that g|Cx(rt) 2 g(Cx) \ {x, y}. Then for every i 2
N \Kx(p), x  rti g|Cx(rt), so that individual i can manipulate g|Cx at rt via profile s
for which s(j) = rt(j) for all j 2 N \ {i} and s1(i) = x, since Kx(s) = Kx(p) + 1 = ,
by the induction hypothesis. Therefore, g|Cx(rt) 2 {x, y} for all t 2 {0, . . . , n}.
Suppose that for some t 2 {0, . . . , n}, g|Cx(rt) = y. If g|Cx(rt+1) = x, then rt 6=
rt+1, which implies that t+1 2 Kx(p) and hence x  rtt+1 y. Therefore, individual t+1
can manipulate g|Cx at rt via rt+1(t + 1), a contradiction. Therefore g|Cx(rt+1) = y,
and by induction g|Cx(r) ⌘ g|Cx(rn) = y.
Denote by C?x the set of all profiles s such that s(i) = r(i) for all i 2 Kx(p) and
s(i) is an arbitrary linear ordering on X for all i 2 N \Kx(p), so that in particular
r 2 C?x. Again, note that #Ns(x, z)   #Kx(s) = #Kx(r) > n2 for all z 2 g(Cx)\{x},
so that C?x ⇢ Cx. Define a new social choice rule g? : C?x ! X by g?(s) = g|Cx(s) for
all s 2 C?x.
Note that r 2 C?x, so that g?(r) = y by construction and y 2 g?(C?x). Next, fix an
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individual i 2 N \Kx(p) and consider a preference profile s such that s1(i) = x and
s(j) = r(j) for all j 2 N \ {i}. Note that #Kx(s) = #Kx(r) + 1 = , so that s 2 C?x
and by the induction hypothesis g?(s) = g|Cx(s) = x. Hence, x 2 g?(C?x).
Let z 2 g(Cx) \ {x, y} and define s such that s(i) = r(i) for all i 2 Kx(p) and
s(i) = (z   y   . . . ) for all i 2 N \Kx(p). Since #Ns(x, z)   #Kx(s) = #Kx(r) > n2
for all z 2 g(Cx) \ {x}, s 2 C?x by construction. Let {st}nt=0 be the standard sequence
from r to s. Note that for all t 2 {0, . . . , n}, #Nst(x, z)   #Kx(st) = #Kx(s) > n2 ,
so that {st}nt=0 ⇢ C?x. By definition, g?(s0) ⌘ g?(r) = y. For t 2 {0, . . . , n}, suppose
that g?(st) = y and g?(st+1) 6= z. If g?(st+1) 62 {y, z}, then st 6= st+1 so that
t + 1 2 N \ Kx(p) and hence y  st+1t+1 g?(st+1). Therefore, individual t + 1 could
manipulate g? ⌘ g|C?x at st+1 via st(t+ 1), a contradiction. Therefore, g?(st) 2 {y, z}
for all t 2 {0, . . . , n}.
Suppose that g?(st) = y for all t 2 {0, . . . , n}, so that in particular g?(s) ⌘
g?(sn) = y. Let profile w 2 Cx be such that g|Cx = z, which necessarily exists
since #g(Cx)   3. Let {st}nt=0 be the modified standard sequence from w to s in
which the preferences of the individuals in Kx(p) are changed before those of the
individuals in N \Kx(p). For t 2 {0, . . . ,  1}, #Nst(x, z)   #Nw(x, z) > n2 for all
z 2 g(Cx) \ {x}, since individual preference ordering w(t) is being replaced with s(t)
for which s1(t) = x. For t 2 {, . . . , n}, #Nst(x, z)   #Kx(st)   #Kx(s) =  1 > n2
for all z 2 g(Cx) \ {x}. Therefore, {st}nt=0 ⇢ Cx.
By definition, g|Cx(s0) ⌘ g|Cx(w) = z. For t 2 {0, . . . ,   2}, suppose that
g|Cx(st) = z and g|Cx(st+1) = y. Since individual t + 1 2 Kx(p), z  st+1t+1 y, so that
individual t + 1 can manipulate g|Cx at profile st+1 via st(t + 1), a contradiction.
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Therefore, g|Cx(st) = z for t 2 {0, . . . ,  1}.
Similarly, for t 2 {, . . . , n}, suppose that g|Cx(st) = z and g|Cx(st+1) = y. Since
z  st+1t+1 y, individual t+1 can manipulate g|Cx at profile st+1 via st(t+1), a contradic-
tion. Therefore, g|Cx(st) = z for t 2 {, . . . , n}. In particular, g|Cx(sn) ⌘ g|Cx(s) ⌘
g?(s) = z. Therefore, for an arbitrary z 2 g(Cx) \ {x, y}, z 2 g?(C?x), which implies
that g?(C?x) = g(Cx).
The restriction g? can be used to induce a social choice rule gˆ : L(X)n +1 ! g(Cx)
the set of individuals in N \ Kx(p) in the natural way. The main result of Aswal,
Chatterji, and Sen (2003) establishes the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem (1973, 1975)
on the domain L(Xx)m for arbitrary finitem; in particular, we may takem = n +1.
Therefore, if gˆ is strategy–proof – a property inherited from g|Cx through g? by the
nature of restrictions – it must be dictatorial with dictator h 2 N \Kx(p).
Choose an arbitrary z 2 g(Cx) \ {x, y} and let profile v be such that v(h) = (z  
x   . . . ) and v(i) = (x   · · ·   z) for all i 2 N \ {h}. Note that for all y 2 X \ {x},
#Nv(x, y)   #Kx(v) = n  1 > n2 since by assumption n > 2, so that v 2 Cx. Define
profile v0 such that v0(i) = r(i) for all i 2 Kx(p) and v0(i) = v(i) for all i 2 N \Kx(p).
Note that for all y 2 X \ {x}, #Nv0(x, y)   #Kx(v0)   #Kx(p) > n2 , so that v0 2 C?x.
Then g|Cx(v0) ⌘ g?(v0) = v01(h) = z, by definition.
Let {vt}nt=0 is the standard sequence from v0 to v. For all t 2 {0, . . . , n}, #Nvt(x, y)  
#Kx(vt)   #Kx(v) > n2 for all y 2 X \ {x}, so that {vt}nt=0 ⇢ Cx. Note that if for
any t 2 {0, . . . , n}, if g|Cx(vt) 62 {x, z}, then individual h can manipulate g|Cx at vt
via any preference ordering s(t) such that s1(t) = x, since x  vth g|Cx(vt) and by the
induction hypothesis, #Kx(s) =  implies that g|Cx(s) for any profile s 2 Cx such
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that s(i) = vt(i) for all i 2 N \ {h} and s1(t) = x. Therefore, g|Cx(vt) 2 {x, z} for all
t 2 {0, . . . , n}.
From above, g|Cx(v0) ⌘ g|Cx(v0) = z. For t 2 {0, . . . , n}, suppose that g|Cx(vt) = z
and g|Cx(vt+1) = x. Then vt 6= vt+1, which implies that t + 1 2 Kx(p), so that
g|Cx(vt+1)  vtt+1 g|Cx(vt) and individual t+1 can manipulate g|Cx at vt via vt+1(t+1),
a contradiction. Therefore, for t 2 {0, . . . , n}, g|Cx(vt) = z implies g|Cx(vt+1) = z. In
particular g|Cx(vn) ⌘ g|Cx(v) = z.
Since v was any profile for which v(i) = (x   · · ·   z) for all i 2 N \(Kx(p)[{h}),
standard sequence arguments imply that g|Cx(v00) = z for all v00 2 Cx such that
v001(h) = z. Similarly, since z 2 g(Cx)\{x, y} was chosen arbitrarily, standard sequence
arguments imply that g|Cx(v000) = y for all v000 2 Cx such that v0001 (h) = y, for all
y 2 g(Cx) \ {x}.
It therefore remains to show that g|Cx(v000) = x for all v000 2 Cx such that v0001 (h) = x.
Note that the arguments of the previous paragraph do not su ce in this case, as the
position of the Condorcet winner x within individual preference orderings cannot be
chosen arbitrarily while remaining in the domain Cx.
For some z 2 Cx \ {x}, let v 2 Cx be such that v(h) = (x   z   . . . ) and y  vi z
for all y 2 g(Cx) \ {z} and all i 2 N \ {h}. By previous arguments, g|Cx(v) 2 {x, z};
otherwise h could manipulate g|Cx at v via v0 2 Cx, where v0(i) = v(i) for all i 2
N \ {h} and v01(h) = z.
Let profile v0 be such that v0(h) = v(h) and for all i 6= h, v0(i) is formed from v(i) by
promoting alternative x to the top of the preference ordering. Note that #Nv0(x, y)  
#Kx(v0) = n, so that v0 2 Cx and by the induction hypothesis, g|Cx(v0) = x.
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Let {v0t}nt=0 be the standard sequence from v to v0, and note that for all t 2
{0, . . . , n}, #Nv0t(x, y)   #Nv(x, y) > n2 for all y 2 X \ {x}, since by assumption
v 2 Cx. By definition, g|Cx(v00) ⌘ g|Cx(v) = z. For t 2 {0, . . . , n}, Suppose that
g|Cx(v0t) = z and g|Cx(v0t+1) 6= z. If g|Cx(v0t+1) 6= x or t + 1 2 N \ {h}, then
individual t + 1 can manipulate g|Cx at v0t+1 via v0t(t + 1), since z  v0t+1t+1 g|Cx(v0t+1).
If g|Cx(v0t+1) = x and t + 1 = h, then individual t + 1 can manipulate g|Cx at v0t via
v0t+1(t + 1), since x  v0t+1t+1 z. Therefore, g|Cx(v0t) = z implies that g|Cx(v0t+1) = z,
so that by induction g|Cx(v0) ⌘ g|Cx(v0n) = z, a contradiction. Therefore, it must be
that g|Cx(v) = x.
Next, let v00 2 Cx be any profile for which v001(h) = x. Let y 2 g(Cx) \ {x}
denote the maximal element in g(Cx) \ {x} under  v00h ; that is, y is the second–most
preferred alternative in g(Cx) at profile v00 by individual h, which necessarily exists
since #g(Cx)   3.
Consider a profile v0 such that v00(h) = v0(h) and for all i 2 N \ {h} v0(i) is
formed from v00(i) by demoting alternative y to the bottom of individual i’s preference
ordering at v0. Since #Nv00(x, z) > n2 implies #Nv0(x, z) >
n
2 for all z 2 X \ {x},
v0 2 Cx. From the arguments of previous paragraphs, g|Cx(v0) = x.
Suppose that #Nv00(x, y) = ↵, and let {v00t}nt=0 be the modified standard sequence
from v0 to v00 in which the preferences of individual h are changed first, followed by the
remaining ↵  1 individuals in Nv00(x, y) are changed first. Note that #Nv00(x, z) > n2
implies #Nv00t(x, z) >
n
2 for all z 2 X \ {x}, so that {v00t}nt=0 ⇢ Cx.
From the arguments above, g|Cx(v00t) 2 {x, y} for all t 2 {0, . . . , n}, and g|Cx(v0) =
g|Cx(v000) = x. For t 2 {0, . . . ,↵}, g|Cx(v00t) = x; otherwise g|Cx(v00t) = x and
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g|Cx(v00t+1) = y, so that individual t + 1 can manipulate g|Cx at v00t+1 via v00t(t + 1),
since x  v00t+1t+1 y.
Therefore, g|Cx(v00t) = x for t 2 {a + 1, . . . , n}; otherwise g|Cx(v00t) = x and
g|Cx(v00t+1) = y, so that individual t+1 can manipulate g|Cx at v00t via v00t+1(t), since
y  v00tt+1 x. Therefore, g|Cx(v00) ⌘ g|Cx(v00n) = x, so that g|Cx(v00) = x for any v00 2 Cx
such that v001(h) = x.
Collecting the arguments of the previous paragraphs, if g? is dictatorial with
dictator h, then g|Cx itself has individual h as the dictator over the alternatives in
g(Cx).
Step 1.3. From the previous two steps, if g|Cx is non–dictatorial then g|Cx(p) = x
for any p 2 Cx for which #Kx(p) > n2 . Assuming that g|Cx is non–dictatorial, it
remains to prove that g|Cx(p) = x if #Np(x, y) > n2 for all y 2 X \ {x}; that is, at all
p 2 Cx.
Suppose that g|Cx is non–dictatorial and there exists a p 2 Cx such that g|Cx(p) =
y for y 2 g(Cx) \ {x}. Let profile q be such that q1(i) = x for all i 2 Np(x, y)
and q(i) = p(i) for all i 2 Np(y, x), and note that #Np(x, z) > n2 implies that
#Nq(x, z) >
n
2 for all z 2 X \ {x}, so that q 2 Cx.
Let {qt}nt=0 be the modified standard sequence from p to q in which the preferences
of the individuals in Np(x, y) are changed first. Note that #Np(x, z) >
n
2 implies
that #Nqt(x, z) >
n
2 for all z 2 X \ {x}, so that {qt}nt=0 ⇢ Cx. By assumption,
g|Cx(p) ⌘ g|Cx(q0) = y. For t 2 {0, . . . ,#Np(x, y) 1}, suppose that g|Cx(qt) 6= x but
g|Cx(qt+1) = x. Then individual t+ 1 can manipulate g|Cx at qt via qt+1(t+ 1), since
x  qt+1t+1 g|Cx(qt), a contradiction. Therefore, g|Cx(qt) 6= x for t 2 {0, . . . ,#Np(x, y)}.
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By Step 2 above, g|Cx(qt) = x for t 2 {#Np(x, y) + 1, . . . , n}, since #Kx(qt) =
#Np(x, y) >
n
2 . However, by the construction of q, q
#Np(x,y)+1 = q#Np(x,y), a con-
tradiction. Therefore, g|Cx(p) = x for all profiles p 2 Cx, a contradiction since
#g(Cx)   3. Therefore, if g|Cx is strategy–proof must be dictatorial with respect to
the alternatives in Cx.
Part 2: Suppose that g|Cx is strategy–proof and x 62 g(Cx).
Step 2.1. Define the subdomain Ux as follows: for all p 2 Ux and all i 2 N , p1(i) =
x, pk(i) 2 g(Cx) for k 2 {2, . . . ,#g(Cx) + 1}, and (p#g(Cx)#+2(i)   p#g(Cx)#+3(i)  
. . . ) is some fixed ordering of the alternatives in X \ (g(Cx) [ x) for all i 2 N . Note
that for all p 2 Ux, #Kp(x) = n > n2 , so that Ux ⇢ Cx and therefore g(Ux) ✓ g(Cx).
For y 2 g(Cx), let p 2 Cx be such that g|Cx(p) = y and let u 2 Ux be such that
p2(i) = y for all i 2 N . Let {ut}nt=0 denote the standard sequence from p to u, and
note that #Nut(x, z)   #Np(x, z) > n2 for all z 2 X \ {x}, so that {ut}nt=0 ⇢ Cx.
By construction, g|Cx(u0) ⌘ g|Cx(p) = y. For t 2 {#Np(x, y) + 1, . . . , n   1},
suppose that g|Cx(ut) = y and g|Cx(ut+1) 2 X \ {x, y}. Then individual t + 1 can
manipulate g|Cx at ut+1 via ut(t+1), since y  ut+1t+1 g|Cx(ut+1), a contradiction. There-
fore, g|Cx(ut) = y for t 2 {#Np(x, y) + 1, . . . , n} and hence g(Cx) ✓ g(Ux), so that
g(Ux) = g(Cx).
Note that within Ux, preferences with respect to the elements of g(Ux) are unre-
stricted and #g(Ux)   3. The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem (1973, 1975) therefore
implies that g|Cx must be dictatorial over Ux with respect to the set of alternatives
g(Cx). Without loss of generality suppose that individual 1 is the dictator.
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Step 2.2. Let p 2 Ux be such that g|Cx(p) = y, and p(1) 2 Cx be any profile such
that p(1)(i) = p(i) for all i{2, . . . , n}. Let y 2 g(Cx) be maximal in g(Cx) under
p(1)(1). If g|Cx(p(1)) 6= y, then individual 1 can manipulate g|Cs at p(1) via p(1), since
y  p(1)1 g|Cx(p(1)), a contradiction. Therefore, g|Cx is dictatorial with respect to g(Cx)
with individual 1 as the dictator at all such profiles p(1).
Next consider any profile p(2) 2 Cx such that p(2)(i) = p(1)(i) for all i{1, 3, . . . , n}.
If g|Cx(p(2))  p
(2)
2 y, then individual 2 can manipulate g|Cx at p(1) via p(2)(2), a contra-
diction. Further, if y  p(2)2 g|Cx(p(2)), then individual 2 can manipulate g|Cx at p(2) via
p(1)(2), a contradiction. Therefore, g|Cx(p(2)) = y and hence g|Cx is dictatorial with
respect to g(Cx) with individual 1 as the dictator at all such profiles p(2). Proceeding
inductively, g|Cx is dictatorial with respect to g(Cx) with individual 1 as the dictator
at all such profiles p(k), for k 2 {1, . . . , n}.
The entire domain Cx can be reconstructed from such an sequence of profiles p(k).
Note that from any q 2 Cx there exists a profile u 2 Ux at which each individual’s
relative ordering of the alternatives in Xx is identical to their relative ordering at
q. Let {qt}nt=0 be the standard sequence from u to q, and note that #Nqt(x, z)  
#Nq(x, z) >
n
2 by definition, so that {qt}nt=0 ⇢ Cx. Furthermore, qt corresponds to
a profile of the type p(t) from above, so that individual 1 is the dictator at all qt. In
particular, individual 1 is the dictator at an arbitrary profile q 2 Cx.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Commitment Mechanism Usage In ATE
Recall Equation 3.26,
cT >
✓
1    +   
1   
◆
cM , (B.1)
which embodies joint conditions on cT , cM ,  , and   under which the sophisticated
agent will employ the commitment mechanism of membership termination using an
alternating termination equilibrium. Note that
d
d 

1    +   
1   
 
=
 
(1   )2 > 0, (B.2)
which implies that that Equation 3.26 is satisfied at some  ¯, it is satisfied at all   >  ¯
holding all other parameters fixed, since cT , cM < 0 and   > 0. Similarly,
d
d 

1    +   
1   
 
=
 
1    > 0, (B.3)
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which implies that that Equation 3.26 is satisfied at some  ¯, it is satisfied at all   >  ¯
holding all other parameters fixed, since cT , cM < 0 and   > 0.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 3.3.1
Proof. The result follows readily from Billingsley (1968) and Dobb’s Martingale Con-
vergence Theorem.
Following Feldman (1991), from the perspective of the learning–na¨ıve agent the
set of possible complete descriptions of  ˆ, the time–invariant value of the quasi–
hyperbolic discount factor entering into the utility calculations of past– and future–
period selves, can be represented as a separable metric space ⇥ with Borel  –field
B(⇥). Uncertain as to the value of her true quasi–hyperbolic discount factor,   2 ⇥,
the agent is endowed with prior beliefs µ1 on (⇥, B(⇥))1 and an induced probability
Pµ1 on an infinite horizon belief–outcome space. Let {µt}1t=1 denote the sequence of
posterior beliefs, and note that since f has positive on
✓ cE
  
,
 cE
 
◆
, there is su cient
variance in the stochastic benefit process for the learning–na¨ıve agent to realize both
periods of maintenance and periods of exercise. Noting that the sequence of beliefs
are a martingale with respect to the probability Pµ1 , it follows from the Martingale
Convergence Theorem (Doob, 1953) that the Bayesian beliefs converge almost surely
(with respect to Pµ1) to some limit belief µ1.
Given that {µt}1t=1 converges almost surely to µ1, suppose that µ1 does not
coincide with the degenerate distribution that puts unit probability on  ˆ =  ; that
is, µ1 does not coincide with the true distribution of  . If the learning–na¨ıve agent
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has not yet terminated her membership, belief updating proceeds according to
µt(x) ⌘ µt 1(x|dt 1 = E, bt 1)
=
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
0, if 0  x   cE
 bt 1
µt 1(x)Z 1
 cE/ bt 1
µt 1(y)dy
, if
 cE
 bt 1
< x  1
(B.4)
and
µt(x) ⌘ µt 1(x|dt 1 = M, bt 1)
=
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
µt 1(x)Z  cE/ bt 1
0
µt 1(y)dy
, if 0  x   cE
 bt 1
0, if
 cE
 bt 1
< x  1,
(B.5)
which are not stationary processes for generic draws from the distribution f on B.
Therefore, if µ1 does not coincide with the true distribution of  , it follows that the
agent previously terminated her membership in some (finite) period ⌧ .
If µ1 coincides with the true distribution of  , then by the convergence it follows
that for every ✏ > 0, there exists a ⌧ 2 {1, 2, 3, . . . } such that for every t   ⌧ ,
   Eµt [ ˆ]  Eµ1 [ ˆ]    < ✏. (B.6)
Choosing ✏ 2 (0,  ¯    ), there exists a (finite) ⌧ such that for all t   ⌧ , Eµt [ ˆ] <  ¯.
Therefore, the agent will terminate her membership in period ⌧ .
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B.3 Mathematica Simulation
Mathematica Simulation of the Partially–Na¨ıve Agent of Subsection 3.3.5.
Clear[beta, delta, cE, bbar, benchmark, t, b, M, r, count];
beta = 1/4;
delta = 1/2;
cE = -25;
bbar = 60;
benchmark = (3*(53*Sqrt[106]-557))/(5*(71*Sqrt[106]-785));
count = 0;
r = {};
(*Perform 1,000 simulation runs*)
While[count < 1000,
(*Reset delay count*)
t = 0;
(*Reset prior beliefs*)
mu =.;
mu[x_] := Piecewise[{{1/100, 0 <= x <= 98/99}, {4901/50, 98/99 < x <= 1}}];
(*Simulate single decision problem*)
While[NIntegrate[x*mu[x], {x, 0, 1}] > benchmark,
(*Generate realization of benefit to exercising*)
Clear[b];
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b = 10*(5 - Log[1 - RandomReal[{0, 1}]]);
(*Choose current-period optimal action*)
Clear[M];
M = If[cE + (beta*delta*b) > 0, 0, 1];
(*Update beliefs based on last period’s action*)
temp =.;
temp[x_] :=
Simplify[
M*Piecewise[{{mu[x]/
Integrate[mu[y], {y, 0, Min[-cE/(delta*b), 1]}],
0 <= x <= Min[-cE/(delta*b), 1]}, {0,
Max[-cE/(delta*b), 0] < x <= 1}}] + (1 - M)*
Piecewise[{{0, 0 <= x <= Min[-cE/(delta*b), 1]}, {
mu[x]/Integrate[mu[y], {y, Max[-cE/(delta*b), 0], 1}],
Max[-cE/(delta*b), 0] < x <= 1}}]];
mu =.;
mu[x_] = temp[x];
t++;
]
(*Save number of periods prior to termination*)
Clear[tempR];
tempR = Append[r, t];
r = tempR;
count++;
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]
Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 4
C.1 Proof of Lemma 4.3.4
Proof. Let   be a biclique network and  2 P be given. By Gale & Shapley (1962), there exists
µ 2 U(M,W, ). Since   is biclique, (m,µ(m)) 2   for all m 2M, and naturally (w, µ(w)) 2   for
all w 2W; hence, µ respects  . Moreover, since µ is a stable matching, it is individually rational and
has no blocking pairs. In particular, this implies that µ has no local blocking pairs on  . Therefore,
µ 2 U(M,W, ) implies that µ 2 U T (M,W, ) ✓ U I (M,W, ).
Suppose next that µ 2 U T (M,W, ) but µ 62 U(M,W, ). Since µ is technologically  –stable,
it must be individually rational; hence, if µ 62 U(M,W, ) then it must be the case that µ is blocked
by some blocking pair (m,w) 2 M ⇥W . Having assumed that   is biclique, (m,w) 2   so that
(m,w) is in fact a local blocking pair for µ on  , a contradiction. Therefore, µ 2 U T (M,W, )
implies that µ 2 U(M,W, ).
Following the logic of the previous paragraph, µ 2 U I (M,W, ) implies that µ 2 U(M,W, ).
Therefore, when   is biclique
U(M,W, ) = U T (M,W, ) = U I (M,W, ) (C.1)
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for any preference profile  2 P.
C.2 Proof of Proposition 4.3.5
Proof. Let M, W, and  2 P be given such that there exist m 2 M and w 2 W with w  m m
and m  w w. Define a network   on M ⇥W as follows: (m0, w0) 2   if and only if m0  m0 w0 or
w0  w0 m0. That is,   consists only of links between man–woman pairs for whom one of the parties
finds the other unacceptable.
By Gale & Shapley (1962), there exists µ 2 U(M,W, ). To achieve a contradiction, suppose
that for every µ 2 U(M,W , ), µ(m0) = m0 for all m0 2 M and µ(w0) = w0 for all w0 2 W .
By assumption, w  m m and m  w w, so that (m,w) 2 M ⇥W could block µ, a contradiction.
Therefore, there exists a matching µ 2 U(M,W, ) at which at least one man is matched. Define
(mˆ, wˆ) 2M⇥W such that µ(mˆ) = wˆ.
Note that by construction µ does not respect  : the individual rationality of µ implies that
wˆ  mˆ mˆ and mˆ  wˆ wˆ, so that (mˆ, wˆ) 62  . Hence, µ 2 U(M,W, ) but µ 62 U T (M,W, ), so that
U(M,W , ) 6✓ U T (M,W, ).
By Theorem 4.3.8, there exists ⌫ 2 U T (M,W, ). Moreover, ⌫(m0) = m0 for all m0 2M, since
µ is individually rational and for all w0 2W , (m0, w0) 2   implies that m0  m0 w0 or w0  w0 m0, by
construction. Consequently, ⌫(w0) = w0 for all w0 2W.
Note that ⌫ is not stable on the marriage problem hM,W, i; by assumption w  m m ⌘ ⌫(m)
and m  w w = ⌫(w), so that (m,w) 2 M ⇥ W blocks ⌫. Hence, ⌫ 2 U T (M,W, ) but ⌫ 62
U(M,W, ), so that U T (M,W, ) 6✓ U(M,W, ), as desired.
C.3 Proof of Proposition 4.3.7
Proof. Let M, W, and   (M⇥W be given. Since   is not biclique, there exists (mˆ, wˆ) 2M⇥W
such that (mˆ, wˆ) 62  .
Consider any preference profile  2 P such that
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(i) wˆ  mˆ w for all w 2W \ {wˆ}, and;
(ii) mˆ  wˆ m for all m 2M\ {mˆ}.
By Gale & Shapley (1962), there exists µ 2 U(M,W, ). If µ(mˆ) 6= wˆ, then (mˆ, wˆ) can block
µ, since by (i) and (ii) above, wˆ  mˆ µ(mˆ) and mˆ  wˆ µ(wˆ). Therefore, µ(mˆ) = wˆ, so that µ does not
respect  . Hence, µ 2 U(M,W, ) but µ 62 U T (M,W, ), so that U(M,W, ) 6✓ U T (M,W, ).
By Theorem 4.3.8, there exists ⌫ 2 U T (M,W, ). Since ⌫ respects  , ⌫(mˆ) 6= wˆ. However,
by (i) and (ii) above, (mˆ, wˆ) is a blocking pair for ⌫ on the marriage problem hM,W, i since
wˆ  mˆ ⌫(mˆ) and mˆ  wˆ ⌫(wˆ). Hence, ⌫ 2 U T (M,W, ) but ⌫ 62 U(M,W, ), so that U T (M,W, 
) 6✓ U(M,W, ), as desired.
C.4 Proof of Theorem 4.3.8
Proof. Given a marriage network hM,W, , i, the Men–Proposing Network–Respecting Deferred
Acceptance Algorithm (NDAA) proceeds as detailed below. The Women–Proposing NDAA is de-
fined analogously by reversing the roles of the men and the women.
Let hM,W , , i be a given marriage network. For each agent m 2M construct a new prefer-
ence profile  0m from  m and   as follows:
(i) For all w 2W such that m  m w, let m  0m w;
(ii) For all w 2W such that (m,w) 62  , let m  0m w;
(iii) For all w, w˜ 2W such that w  m w˜  m m, (m,w) 2  , and (m, w˜) 2  , let w  0m w˜  0m m.
Note that preferences over unacceptable women at  0m have not been uniquely specified; as in
the standard matching literature, stability results on marriage networks are robust to arbitrary
re–orderings of the relative preference ranking of unacceptable agents.
Applying the analogous operations, construct preferences  0w from  w for all w 2 W. Let  0
denote the newly constructed preference profile, and let µ be the stable matching selected by the
Men–Proposing Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (Gale & Shapley, 1962) on the marriage problem
hM,W, 0i.
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By the stability of µ on hM,W, 0i, µ is individually rational with respect to  0. That is, for
all m 2 M, if µ(m) 2 W then µ(m)  0m m. In particular, this implies that if µ(m) 2 W, then
(m,µ(m)) 2   by the construction of  0. Applying the same argument to the set of women, the
matching µ respects  . Moreover, since w  0m m implies that w  m m by the construction of  0,
individual rationality of µ with respect to  0 implies individual rationality with respect to  .
It remains to show that µ has no local blocking pairs on   at preference profile  . Suppose that
(m,w) 2 M ⇥W forms a local blocking pair; that is, w  m µ(m), m  w µ(w) and (m,w) 2  .
By the construction of  0, this implies that w  0m µ(m) and m  0w µ(w). Therefore, (m,w) is a
blocking pair for µ under  0, a contradiction to the stability of µ.
Therefore µ 2 U T (M,W, ), so that there exists a technologically  –stable matching on the
marriage network hM,W, , i.
C.5 Proof of Proposition 4.3.10
Proof. For a fixed marriage network hM,W, , i, suppose there exists a matching µ 2 U T (M,W, 
) that is Pareto dominated by a matching ⌫ that respects  . That is, ⌫ %i µ for all i 2 N , and
⌫  j µ for some j 2 N .
Since (j, ⌫(j)) 2  , if ⌫  ⌫(j) µ, then (j, ⌫(j)) is a local blocking pair for µ, a contradiction.
Therefore, ⌫ ⇠⌫(j) µ. Since agents have strict preferences over matching partners, this implies that
j = µ(⌫(j)), which contradicts the assumption that ⌫  j µ.
Therefore, the set of technologically  –stable matchings is Pareto dominant in the set of match-
ings that respect  .
C.6 Proof of Proposition 4.3.11
Proof. Let  , M, and W be such that there exists m 2 M and w 2 W for whom w  m m and
m  w w. Define   ⇢M ⇥W to be such that (m0, w) 62   for all m0 2M and (m,w0) 62   for all
w0 2W. That is,   is such that man m and woman w have no acquaintances in  .
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Let µ 2 U I (M,W, ) be such that µ(m) = m and µ(w) = w. Note that such an informa-
tionally  –stable matching exists by applying Corollary 4.3.9 to the marriage network hM0,W 0, 
|M0⇥W0 , |M0⇥W0i, where M0 ⌘ M \ {m} and W 0 ⌘ W \ {w}. Since man m and woman w have
no acquaintances in  , they cannot be members of any local blocking pair of µ on  ; moreover, by
construction µ has no local blocking pairs that do not contain either man m or woman w.
Consider the matching ⌫ such that ⌫(m) = w and ⌫(i) = µ(i) for all i 2 N \ {m,w}, and note
that ⌫ 2 U I (M,W, ) since µ had no local blocking pairs, w  m m, and m  w w. Note moreover
that ⌫ %i µ for all i 2 N , and ⌫  i µ for i 2 {m,w}. Hence, µ 2 U I (M,W, ) is Pareto dominated
by ⌫ 2 U I (M,W, ).
C.7 Proof of Theorem 4.3.15
Proof. Let µ be the stable matching selected by the Men–Proposing Network–Respecting Deferred
Acceptance Algorithm on the marriage network hM,W, , i. By the definition of technological
achievability, showing that µ is the MT –optimal stable matching is equivalent to showing that for
each m 2 M, µ(m) is maximal with respect to  m in A T (m;M,W, ). As in Gale & Shapley
(1962), this can be shown by demonstrating that no man is ever rejected by a technologically
achievable woman in the Men–Proposing Network–Respecting Deferred Acceptance Algorithm; since
it is incentive compatible for men to make proposals in the order of their preferences, this implies
that each man is matched with his most–preferred technologically achievable woman.
The proof is by induction. Suppose that no man has yet been rejected by a woman who is
technologically achievable to him when woman w 2W rejects man m 2M. Note that this implies
that (m,w) 2  , as man m cannot propose to women with whom he is unacquainted. If w  w m,
then w is not technologically achievable for man m, and the next round of proposals begins with no
man having ever been rejected by a woman who is technologically achievable to him.
If m  w w but woman w rejects man m, she must have received a proposal from some man
m0 2M such that m0  w m. By the definition of the algorithm, (m0, w) 2   and man m0 prefers
woman w to any woman except those who have already rejected him and those with whom he is
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unacquainted, who, by the inductive argument, are necessarily unachievable to him.
Consider a hypothetical matching ⌫ that respects   such that ⌫(m) = w and everyone else is
matched to a technologically achievable partner (or left unmatched, if no technologically achievable
partners remain). By the above argument, w  m0 ⌫(m0), m0  w ⌫(w), and (m0, w) 2  . Therefore,
(m0, w) is a local blocking pair for ⌫ in  .
Note that the set of matchings from which ⌫ was drawn includes the set of all technologically
network–stable matchings at which man m is matched to woman w. Therefore, there is no techno-
logically  –stable matching that matches m and w, so that woman w is technologically unachievable
for man m, and the next round of proposals begins with no man having ever been rejected by a
woman who is technologically achievable to him.
It therefore follows that µ(m) is maximal in A T (m;M,W, ) with respect to  m, so that
the matching produced by the Men–Proposing Network–Respecting Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
is indeed MT –optimal. An analogous proof shows that the matching produced by the Women–
Proposing Network–Respecting Deferred Acceptance Algorithm is indeed WT –optimal.
C.8 Proof of Theorem 4.3.18
Proof. Let µ, µ0 2 U T (M,W, ) and suppose that µ %M µ0 and there exists w 2 W such that
µ  w µ0.
Since µ and µ0 are individually rational, agents’ preferences are strict, and µ  w µ0, there exists
m 2M such that µ(w) = m; in particular, this implies that (m,w) 2  . Moreover, µ  w µ0 implies
that µ0(m) 6= w, since otherwise µ(w) = µ0(w) and therefore µ ⇠w µ0.
Therefore, there exist (m,w) 2M ⇥W such that (m,w) 2  , w  m µ0(m), and m  w µ0(w),
so that (m,w) forms a local blocking pair for µ0 on  , a contradiction.
Therefore, µ %M µ0 implies that µ0 %W µ. A symmetric argument proves the reverse implication.
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C.9 Proof of Theorem 4.3.20
Proof. Let hM,W, , i be a marriage network with µ, ⌫ 2 U T (M,W, ), and define   = (µ ^ ⌫)
to be the meet of µ and ⌫.
For w 2 W, suppose that  (w) = m for some m 2 M and that, without loss of generality,
µ(w) = m. This implies that m %w ⌫(w) and (m,w) 2  , by the definition of the meet. If
 (m) 6= w, then the definition of the meet further implies that  (m) = ⌫(m) 6= w and hence
w  m ⌫(m). Therefore, (m,w) 2 M ⇥W is a local blocking pair for ⌫, a contradiction. Hence,
 (w) = m implies  (m) = w for all (m,w) 2M⇥W .
To see the reverse implication, define
W 0 = {w 2W :  (w) 2M}
= {w 2W : µ(w) 2M or ⌫(w) 2M} ,
(C.2)
where the last equality follows from the fact that µ and ⌫ are individually rational and each woman
w gets her maximal match from {µ(w), ⌫(w)}. By our above result, we have that
 (W 0) ✓ {m 2M :  (m) 2W}
= {m 2M : µ(m) 2W and ⌫(m) 2W} ⌘M0,
(C.3)
where the last equality follows from the fact that µ and ⌫ are individually rational and each man m
gets his minimal match from {µ(m), ⌫(m)}. Note that |M0| = |µ(M0)| and | (W 0)| = |W 0| since µ
and   are one–to–one matchings. Moreover, by construction |W 0|   |µ(M0)|, since every matched
partner of each m 2 M0 under µ is included in W 0 by definition. Note that  (W 0) ✓ M0 implies
that | (W 0)|  |M0|, so that the above system of inequalities implies that | (W 0)| = |M0| and hence
 (W 0) =M0.
Hence, if m 2M0, then  (m) = w for some w 2 W 0, so  (w) = m by the above reasoning. If
m 62M0,  (m) = m. That is, if  (m) = w for some (m,w) 2M⇥W, then  (w) = m. Combining
both implications shows that   is a well–defined matching, with  (m) = w if and only if  (w) = m,
for all (m,w) 2M⇥W .
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It is straightforward to see that   is individually rational and respects   whenever µ and ⌫
are technologically  –stable. It therefore remains to show that   does not have any local blocking
pairs. To achieve a contradiction, suppose that (m,w) 2M⇥W is a local blocking pair of  ; that
is, (m,w) 2  , w  m  (m) and m  w  (w). Without loss of generality, suppose that  (m) =
⌫(m) 6= w. Then by the construction of   and the transitivity of preferences, w  m ⌫(m) and
m  w  (w) %w ⌫(w), so that (m,w) are a local blocking pair for ⌫, a contradiction.
Therefore,   = (µ^⌫) 2 U T (M,W, ); that is,   is a well–defined matching that is individually
rational, respects  , and has no local blocking pairs. Analogous arguments show that   = (µ_ ⌫) 2
U T (M,W , ).
C.10 Proof of Theorem 4.4.2
Proof. Given a network formation game hM,W, {ui}i2N i, let µ 2 U T (M,W, ), where the prefer-
ence relation  i is represented by the utility function ui for all i 2 N . Define pure–strategy profile
s be such that si(j) = 1 if and only if µ(i) = j.
Holding the strategy profiles of players N \ {i} fixed, consider the best–response strategy of
player i. Since sj(i) = 0 for all j 6= µ(i), any strategy that sets si(j) = 1 for j 6= µ(i) is strictly
dominated by si(j) = 0; proposing a link to such a player j will incur player i the propositional
cost ✏ but will not change the set of player with whom player i can potentially match, since the link
(i, j) will not be formed. Similarly, the bounds on c insure that the matching–utility of all players
in any stable matching exceeds the cost of link formation, so that setting si(µ(i)) = 1 dominates
si(µ(i)) = 0. Hence, pure strategy si is a best response to s i, so that pure–strategy profile s
constitutes a pairwise–Nash equilibrium.
The reverse implication follows immediately from Lemma 4.4.3 and definition of stability.
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C.11 Proof of Lemma 4.4.3
Proof. Given a network formation game hM,W, {ui}i2N i, suppose that s? is a pure–strategy
pairwise–Nash equilibrium of the network formation game preceding the selection of a technologi-
cally network–stable matching. To achieve a contradiction, suppose that µ, ⌫ 2 U (s?)T (M,W, ),
where  (s?) is the network resulting (deterministically) from strategy profile s? and the preference
relation  i is represented by the utility function ui for all i 2 N .
If µ 6= ⌫, then there exists i 2 N such that µ(i) 6= ⌫(i). Since  i is complete and asymmetric,
without loss of generality it must be the case that µ(i)  i ⌫(i). Then E[ui( (s? i, s˜i)] > E[ui( (s?))],
where s˜i(j) = si(j) for j 6= ⌫(i) and s˜i(⌫(i)) = 0; strict inequality is guaranteed since ⌫ 2
U (s
?)
T (M,W, ) implies that s?i (⌫(i)) = 1. Since this contradicts the assumption that s? is a pure–
strategy pairwise–Nash equilibrium, it must be that µ = ⌫ and henceU (s
?)
T (M,W, ) = {µ}. More-
over, repeated application of the above reasoning shows that µ(i) = j if and only if s?i (j) = 1.
